Online Resource for

NATO's Lessons in Crisis:

Institutional Memory in International Organizations

(Oxford University Press, 2018)

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Chapter 1: Lessons in Failure: Institutional Memory of Strategic Errors

Budgetary Constraints on IOs

As described in Chapter 1, IOs are increasingly facing challenges in sharing knowledge from outgoing elites to incoming elites in response to budget cuts by their member states. In response, IOs have minimized their costs, including expensive pension payments, by reducing hiring, shortening job contracts, and increasing the rate of rotations. These organizations continue to struggle to find ways to do more with less. One way of cutting costs involves shortening the job contracts of secretariat staff and secretariat elites. At NATO, staff come into the IS on three-year contracts that may or may not be renewed for an additional three years. Another way of cutting costs is for member states to leave posts empty for several months, even up to a year, between rotations so that the state does not have to pay for the position during that time.

These measures are a direct response to changes in funding by member states. Between 2009 and 2014, total military spending by non-US NATO member states decreased by 13 percent and US military spending dropped by 22 percent, as seen in Figure A. Figure B illustrates a simultaneous decrease in the percentage of GDP that NATO member states allocated to military spending. The financing and resources that the states provide make it possible for IOs to meet increasing demands for intervention. In turn, a state's availability of soldiers, fighter jets, and weapon systems depends on that state's existing investments in its own military. When states shrink their defense budgets, they de facto restrict the resources that could be used by the IOs in which they participate. In such a financial climate, it is remarkable that these IOs continue to develop any institutional memory.

Figure A: Non-US NATO Military Spending, 2004–2014

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 2016. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

Figure B: US and Non-US NATO Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 2016. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

Description of Subject Recruitment

Subject recruitment required overcoming significant barriers to access to elites at one of the world's most restricted military organizations. To recruit elites to the study, I sent hundreds of emails and follow-up phone requests in order to schedule appointments with elites (and often reschedule them as their schedules changed). I traveled to the institutions across countries as indicated in Chapter 1 and experienced numerous security checks and questions to confirm my identity and objectives as a scholar. In accordance with IRB protocol, I began recruitment by first requesting and receiving email authorization from the public affairs offices of the NATO institutions.

I conducted random sampling to access elites at the first two institutions (NAC and MC). Beginning with the NAC, I used publicly available email addresses on national delegation websites to contact all twenty-eight national delegations and request interviews with the respective permanent representatives. I aimed at preempting concerns about my credibility as a scholar by including hyperlinks to my professional website and to a relevant publication in the signature of my email. In cases where there was no email address publicly available for a given delegation, I requested the email address of the permanent representative's secretary of that delegation from a different permanent representative's secretary. Following journalistic standards, I then followed up emails with phone calls to secretaries, beginning three days after the email request and continuing every three days after that until I either had an appointment or a firm decline. Upon request, I provided secretaries and assistants with my CV and identity card so that they could confirm my identity and provide me access through security to NATO institutions.

For the MC, I gained access through contacts acquired at the respective national delegations. After having interviewed the permanent representatives and having met many of their secretaries in person, I called and emailed all twenty-eight secretaries of the NATO permanent representatives in order to request the contact information of the assistants to the respective military representatives. I then called and emailed all twenty-eight military representatives' assistants to schedule interviews with the representatives.

To access elites at the remaining NATO institutions, I had to use snowball sampling because the contact information was not publicly available for IS, IMS, ACO, and ACT elites. The snowball occurred in one of three ways. First, a NAC or MC elite both provided the email address of a potential subject and agreed to let me use his or her name in the subject line of the interview request. Second, a NAC or MC elite provided an email introduction that allowed me to make the interview request to the potential subject. Third, a NAC or MC elite provided me with the email address of a public affairs officer in one of the four institutions and this officer then circulated my interview request to the respective elites in that institution.

Demographic and Institutional Characteristics of Elites in Sample

The sample approximated the population with respect to demographics. Subjects ranged in age from 35 to 67 (mean = 53, st. dev.= 6.6) and represented the nationalities of all twenty-eight member states. Only 7 percent of the sample were women, whereas women make up about 10 percent of NATO forces.[1] In 2015, women were particularly underrepresented in leadership roles, with no women in any of NATO's top political or military leadership positions. In the sample, 54 percent of elites sampled served in civilian posts and 46 percent served in military posts. The most well represented nationalities were American (18 percent), British (11 percent),

and French (8 percent). The United States, United Kingdom, and France are the largest

contributors to the NATO budget and thus widely represented. Just as the top civilian (Secretary-

General) and top military (SACEUR) roles are reserved for a European and an American, many

leading secretariat posts had a traditional American, British, or French nationality assigned to it.

Elites had a wide range of total experience working in or for NATO, from zero years to 55 years

(mean = 7, std. dev.= 7.5).

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    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.         Min         Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
         age |        120    52.88333     6.595368          35          67
      gender |        120    .0666667     .2504897           0           1
 nationality |        120    17.39167     8.964258           1          28
       hypsc |        120    .1416667       .35017           0           1
 institution |        120        3.95     1.699481           1           6
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
     workfor |        120    .5333333     .5009794           0           1
      civmil |        120    .4583333       .50035           0           1
          fe |        120          .4      .491952           0           1
  currentyrs |        108    2.822685     2.678715           0          15
     totalyrs |        109    7.354771     7.572966           0        54.5
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Chapter 2: Tête-à-Tête: The Informal Development of Institutional Memory

No Supplementary Materials

Chapter 3: Dilemmas in Design: Constraints on Sharing Knowledge of Errors

Figure C: Alternative Term for Strategic Error

N=65

Note: Elites not included in the sample of 65 did not use any term to refer to the action.

Figure D: Whether Strategic Errors Are Overlooked: Question 5

N=77

**Figure E: Types of Strategic Errors: Question 2**

A	Miscellaneous*
B	Lack of anticipation of threat
C	Providing insufficient resources
D	Strategic errors do not occur
E	Contradicting the operation's mandate
F	Acting on incorrect information
G	Media publicizes a tactical or operational error
H	Failure to act earlier
I	Loss of support from international community
J	Ending an operation prematurely

* Some elites provided more than one example.

Table A: Quotes on Adjusting Lessons to Increase Likelihood of Endorsement[1]

> **We responded to a couple of taskings from the Military Committee,** that's what we called them. The Military Committee, at the alliance, prepares the thinking on responses to hybrid warfare. **What is it that the alliance should do about hybrid warfare? And they ask us and they ask also Allied Command Operations, the group in Mons, and they do the op thinking, and as—we here in ACT and our colleagues in ACO are passing if you will, versions of the paper back and forth.** There was things that the guys in Mons wanted eliminated that I felt were too important to eliminate and some things that they **wanted to add that I thought compromised the—I thought it was irrelevant to the task at hand** so had a couple of issues that were important to them that they wanted to reiterate. **My opinion was including them in our product was—it was irrelevant to the issue and it was, any time we delude a product with ideas which are outside, you run the**

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[1] The bold in this table and others calls attention to text that is specifically relevant to the title of the table.

risk of not doing what you got asked to do. That happened in my course of eighteen months there, there were probably eight or ten kinds. The way that got worked through is just as I described it. We decided that it was important to us that what we said stayed in there and was [. . .] issues was detracted from the power. I consulted not only with the guys who worked for me but the other flag officers who had an understanding of the issue inside the headquarters. This was a collaborative bunch. I went to the chief of staff [. . .] and then the products went to General [*redacted*]. "Here's what they said they want to add. Here's why we think it's not good. Here's what we think the main thing that they want to take out. Here's why we think it should stay in." And General [*redacted*] and his colleague General [*redacted*] would discuss at the four-star level. **If the staff couldn't come to an agreement on what the appropriate version** was, so that happened—I don't know if it's a dispute or not, but the conversation by four-stars on these kind of things, not just [. . .] but from other guys in headquarters, that happens pretty frequently. We had, just two different opinions from the headquarters here and the headquarters in Mons and **it all got worked out with everybody's satisfaction and that happened.** Yeah, something. I didn't [. . .] but it happens way more often than not, so in general, by the time we deployed some suggestions back to the Military Committee, they were the right one. And they could have been wrong if, for instance, we were, in my opinion, not been as forceful in keeping what we thought the good ideas were in and the good ideas out. But again, we weren't asked a question about should NATO have nuclear weapons or not. Those kind of really hard-hitting issues just weren't in my portfolio, but the questions about how should the alliance respond to the Russian misbehavior, if you will, on the eastern flank. **We did a lot of work together on what's portable, what's necessary now for the first six months? What will we wait twelve months to do? [. . .] I think those are strategic decisions because those—it's all twenty-eight of the nations responding to it and all those [. . .] on patterns I just described to you.** How much is the [. . .] task force have? What is necessary from the land component? What should the [. . .] be between whatever air component [. . .] command and control? This is kind of standard staff work. **But there was not a highlighted, "If we don't do this, everything is going to go straight to hell." I didn't have any of those opportunities. I wish I did, because those were exciting and fun.**[2]

We got an endorsement letter back on one of our reports, but **they only endorsed the things that they had already done. It was obvious whoever had written the endorsement had *not* read the report. And a four-star signed off on it. He couldn't be bothered to put extra thought into it and didn't read it. It's depressing. . . .** That letter was signed March 2—it took them nine months to think about it and send this back.[3]

Our recommendations are also endorsed or not by the two strategic commanders. So when I'm doing a recommendation, when I'm writing a recommendation that speaks about an action to be performed by an action body, that is, and that body could be well beyond my [. . .], that doesn't speak about myself being capable of tasking that one to do something. **My proposals are going to the two strategic commands that are looking at my proposals. They do access the feasibility of those proposals, and they finally endorse with those proposals or not. I am just the proponent of some recommendations. I am not the guy who is pushing, I mean, who is taking measures for implementing those recommendations** because that is in accordance with the chain of command.[4]

It could be for **political reason** because some nation will be very tempted to have it or it could be because from the time you are starting the project, the time you are producing the report, and the time it will be staffed**, the situation can change.** And maybe one of the recommendations you may have—because most of the time what we are working on is sometimes evolving. It means we are starting a project at the first of January, and the project is still working by the staff on this thing. So we are trying to identify the gaps, and some of the gaps that we have identified could be solved during the time that we are working on the project. And then, ACT will endorse or not the report, and then it would be implemented through NATO. It could be, how to say, my few experience I have here, it could be a small recommendation that can be staffed by **just adding a paragraph** to the doctrine or it could be a recommendation that will conduct **to issue a full doctrine** on the subject. So that means the role of the JALLC on the strategic level could be very interesting because we can identify some gaps that we can identify, and we write how we identify those gaps. . . .

Since I'm here, I heard **about one or two reports that wasn't endorsed for many reason:** because it was too early, because the conclusion we are not satisfied with it. It can also be that the customer say, "Okay. **You may be right, but it's something that I don't like, and I don't want to hear about it."** Or I heard also from some report, there were for every recommendation that's been endorsed by the IMS, for example, because they always [. . .]. They assume that all those recommendations were free [. . .] and it's been. The percentage between that and that—I can't say that. I will not say it's 30 percent or 40 percent. . . .

But one of the report that was about the protection of the intellectual property was not endorsed at all. **None of the recommendation have been endorsed by ACT, for many reason: because it was maybe too early to speak about that and to issue a specific doctrine about the protection of the intellectual property.**
And you know that in NATO, everything if you want to endorse it at the highest level, you may have the consent of the nation. Then we are starting not to the strategical level, **but to the political one, and then it's out of our scope. [Laughter]** No, it depends of the level of the question asked. Maybe it could be endorsed by ACT, or by SHAPE, or by the NAC. It will depend of the importance, okay, of the subject that we have to deal with. I only know that **at the end of the day, it will be ACT that will request the report** because in the chain of command, we are submitted to the ACT.[5]

Table B: Quotes on Effects of Tasking and Endorsement

Elites self-censor to avoid recording strategic errors as lessons
I went down to this amphibious operations working group. They own a piece of doctrine. Landing the marines on the beach. Very tactical stuff. They had their meeting in Lisbon and wanted someone from JALLC to come speak to them. "We want lessons on amphibious operations." I came to the meeting and put up a PowerPoint presentation that said, "Lessons on Amphibious Operations." I then showed them a blank slide and said, "We have not done any lessons on amphibious operations. That's really at the tactical level so there are no lessons." They were upset. They were raising their voices at me. **The thing is I told them, "The ones who know the lessons are you. You guys know what you're learning, but if you don't share with us, then how can we**

help you?" The problem is they're not recording it. They *are* doing the learning because they're updating their doctrine, but they're also *not* writing these things down.[6]

We don't have a sort of a JALLC, if you like, for anticipation and for looking forward. **Yeah,** I mean the **intelligence often is very biased intelligence.**[7]

In the end they come to the NAC, of course, **this is an entirely cumbersome process**. You ask for compilation and you get a report and you go through the military committee, then it has to go through the committee here from the OPC, and then to the council and by the time the council approves it, the lessons are farther and farther distance from what actually happened. And **the nations have watered them down i**n order not to get any criticism, this are actually, I remember very vividly, the lessons learned that we did after Pakistan after the NRF was for the first and for the time being, the last time, deployed after the earthquake. It was a very short deployment, there were very important strategic lessons, but the main nations were involved in that operation made the final lessons learned paper look like it was a big success. **So basically, they were leading the NRF at the time. They would not let any negative lessons come through.**[8]

The JALLC of course has to do a consensus paper, and so you **know they have their limitations in what they can actually honestly say**. Like **they can't say "you Canada,"** or just "You, Canada, screwed up," because that would just never make it through the process. We did lessons learned here, but you know we—again we have to put these things through committees, and so it **never really is as open and honest as it should be. . . .** I'll tell you. I think actually **there's a big hole in NATO, and that is precisely lessons learned, and I'll give you the example.** And so **everything has to be built from scratch.** So I thought, "Okay let's go find the people who went into Afghanistan because there wasn't much there either, and we'll just get them back." The people before NATO was there. **And I discovered that no one had kept their names, who these people were. There were no records of what was done, or if there were records they were dispersed everywhere**. But it's so obvious to me that we're going to keep going into these situations where there is no—there is ungoverned space, and we need to you know, provide structures. And by the way it's **even more relevant now** because these Jihadi groups are going to ungoverned space and when they leave we have to provide government structures of whatever kind, and we don't keep records. We don't have a template. **We don't have a model. We don't have a list of experts. We're doing it from scratch every time. It's a huge mistake.** It's not really for NATO to do, we're not—we do defense structures. We know how to do that, but overall as an international community we should have a box on the shelf because we're going to need this over and over again and we don't have it. And so you know, coming from NATO this message sort of—I mean it's basically just [kind of the]—NATO doesn't focus on these things so I sort of say it and then it just dies away, but I actually think this is a huge missing piece in the international toolbox.[9]

We know that in NATO we are twenty-eight nations so we have twenty-eight different perceptions as well, so you cannot speak about everything with other allies because you don't want to raise, let's say, a large debate of stipulations—even criticism.[10]

Many Lessons Are Never Endorsed

The customer receives reports, recommendations what should be done, and maybe recommending it action bodies. **So it's up to him to ignore this report or to endorse. So I don't know why some customers will just simply not endorse.** I don't know. But we need to ask customers actually who are receiving those reports why. Maybe report is not good enough, maybe we don't like what it is. But **during the report development we do communicate with customer through his representative so he knows** our analysis design, he knows our initial findings, he knows our you know, final findings so—and we are trying obviously to coordinate everything and at least it's not a surprise for them what is the outcome of our report. So **logically thinking they should implement** but there are reasons . . . [We] talked about getting them by surprise with some kind of strange recommendation, no it's not the case. They know. But sometimes they realize that maybe **they doesn't want to implement. They don't like the truth or the fact, or they for other reasons, they don't want because maybe they see that's kind of could be—it could trigger another stakeholders**—his level stakeholders involved. And he maybe doesn't want to change, or doesn't want to bother them, or I don't know.[11]

Tailoring Lessons to the Interests of Customers

But if you want, as the Brits sort of often use the term, **"politically aware military advice," which generally means that it's not unfettered military advice. It's modified to meet the appetite of the market if you sort of mean. . . . And the top-end of the military are not always right. And you know, we are sometimes seen as manipulating that advice ourselves. So it's a kind of difficult area to be clinical about.**[12]

We will, we would ask, and we will actually ask customers, **"Do you really mean this or exactly do you want us to do this and that,"** or "We would advise you to do this and that." And if customer agrees, so yeah we will change it. **And our experts would help customer to clarify what exactly does he want actually**. So we would help yeah. No, yeah. And he would select and say, "Yeah, yeah, I like this direction or this approach. Please look here, don't look here. Or maybe yeah, please also take this into consideration."[13]

The JALLC can do its analysis but then, in the end, then it gets looked at to make sure that, you know, you're not—they have to be very careful not to criticize a nation, you know, or an individual. And yet that's what lessons learned are about. With somebody made that critical strategic mistake, well who is it and they're responsible. And there are people who would use that as a witch hunt. And sometimes people are not forthcoming doing that. They, you know—I've learned it and I won't make that mistake again. But you know, in the bosses, then know when they've tried it—then spread it out as best they can.[14]

I think it was the NAC but the Military Committee can also give taskings like that. **The chain of command, like SACEUR can ask for things that we learn. We'll look and say, "You don't know what you are asking for because this will upset so and so," or we'll say, "Fantastic! Exactly what we needed. Good thinking, SHAPE. We will take this to the nations as soon as we can."** So then that can be and we can think of things ourselves. The director general can come up and say, "Boys, we need strategic lessons learned from ISAF. The task. Do-do-do, and get started."[15]

Strategic errors? That is the JALLC, Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center in Portugal. They're specially designed. They are, is specially designed for this.[16]

Table C: Quotes on Who Is Responsible for Recording Strategic Errors

Everyone Is Responsible but Few Contribute
JALLC is the custodian for that, and in theory, all NATO units and bodies and HQs feed the NATO lessons learnt database with lessons, that it is not reality because in fact, there are a few lessons learnt databases spread around NATO, because some units have their own internal lessons learnt database. . . . They don't share lessons with JALLC. They share lessons with NATO. Because when they feed the NATO lessons learnt database, it's a common mistake, because **people always think that JALLC has the responsibility to grab the lessons, no. Everybody cannot access the NATO lessons learnt database, and everybody can feed that database. JALLC is just the custodian. . . . In fact, everybody, NATO, has the responsibility to feed that database, so they don't share anything with us.**[17]
They have lessons learned sections there. But they are used for the internal lessons learned process. So for, say, SHAPE internal lessons learned, they don't do these, and I am not able to tell you why. They don't extract . . . they get the lessons learned reports the operational level, and then basically they just forward them to the political level, but they should extract the meaning or the relevance of those lessons to facilitate the strategic decision-makers, to facilitate the JALLC of course to capture the lessons. . . . In exercises, **they [states] should send their lessons, strategic level lessons to the operations guys and vice versa, cause in fact exercise are training for operation right. But what we discovered is that that's not happening right now**. . . . It's probably easier because at the operation or tactical level, when you turn a lesson identified or an observation into a lesson learned, something changes immediately.**[18]**
It's one of the policy regarding lessons learned in the alliances: that everyone is responsible to provide lessons, observations. And build the lessons, which in fact is a little bit unrealistic. You need to have some, a group of individuals, a cell and a section, an entity that collect from the different departments, from the different staff elements, collect the observations, lessons identified that they experienced during exercises or during current crisis. And they are responsible to build the, this observations and this problem, and build and conduct an analysis on the problem, and identity solutions to overcome the this problems or mistakes or errors as we call it that are [. . .]. And that does not exist. So building a structure in the, or the lessons learned across the NATO command structure. It probably . . . my suggestion.[19]
Each one has to fix his own problems. The system is in place to make it work. And that's why it's also very important that close to the commander, close to the leader, there is at least one staff officer that has gone through the lessons learned training courses that are done twice a year in NATO. Because he's the one that's able to advise the boss and say, okay, let's do this thing. Who knows the procedure, who knows how things work. Who know how to make the machinery run? If he hasn't got this advisor close to him, he is sure to fail because he will not be able to tell what to do now. What do we do with this? **"Some of this I know the JALLC will take care of that." But JALLC, no. JALLC monitors the big database and does things of this nature, but just us making studies? No. They only make, their capacity is very limited. They only take studies that**

are really cutting across the whole organization, that require a multidisciplinary approach to the study and that are really of a strategic nature.[20]

Those are lessons. But as I told you, but **JALLC doesn't have any say on the lessons. The lessons are uploaded by everybody within NATO, so if there aren't a specific lesson on a specific topic, it's just because nobody uploaded them, or they are classified, and in that case, they are on the classified side of the NATO lessons learnt database.** The lessons learnt database runs either on the classified side or the unclassified side. **JALLC's core business are the reports, so and now it is of data in order to provide recommendations to the NATO right? Maintaining the lessons learned database, and feeding the lessons learned database as everybody else in NATO, it's just a secondary task [. . .]. The core business is really analysis.**[21]

Anyone can put in a lesson in a shared box at JALLC. Officially, it's a monthly meeting but it didn't happen for two years where we were supposed to talk about what went into the box but that didn't happen. The off-the-record reason is because the task was in the hands of the coordination officer . . . **and it was too much trouble for the coordination officer to coordinate. This says something about JALLC.** Two weeks ago, we issued an update to the SOP that's supposed to reinvigorate the process. Now someone who is not tasked with coordination is going to be coordinating it.[22]

Well of course, lessons learned is a misnomer because we can't learn lessons for anybody. **We can help identify them, we can't learn them.** The organization, the organization agencies, they've got to learn truly their own lessons [as they produce something], whether change something, whatever that change may be.[23]

Commanders Are Responsible but May or May Not Follow Through

The JALLC is sort of the institution that should wrap up lessons learned. But you've got lessons learned that are being identified by the Air Component Commander (and other commanders).[24]

I think **responsibilities at that level lie within the strategic commanders.** Both of them have the responsibility to have a lesson learned capability in place, and that lesson learned capability is meant to identify, whether you want to call them errors, or whether you want to call them things that need to improve, or something that needs to be completely new—developed. But it's the strategic level that has the responsibility to identify the mistakes and to remediate that mistake. In that context, when something is difficult because it's complex, we might be asked to look at that, but they have the responsibility. Our commander doesn't have authority to implement anything. **We only provide you with a report after we conduct an analysis. This is what we think is wrong, this is what we think you should do to fix the problem, and this is who we think should do it. Now it's for that authority to endorse the report and to take action, or not**. 0So when you're looking at the strategic level, ACO has responsibility for operations, and ACT for, say, exercises and transformation.[25]

If the commander doesn't do that, and at the other end of the scale, you might have a commander, and so frequently we do, because you know, the best commanders have done operations and all that all through life. They're warriors. So they may well have the view that, "Lessons? I don't do lessons. That's something that someone else does for me." I'm more focused on avoiding civilian casualties and operations and maybe not have, know the importance of lessons. And if he doesn't emphasize that to his people and lead from the front with the leadership aspect, the mindset won't be in the headquarters, and it will be lessons will become an

afterthought. Oh, please do. Yeah, lessons will become an afterthought, so . . . Which is the constant battle we have. We're down to the characteristics of the particular leader. You get some very, very good leaders who are very, very on sight with and understand the requirement for lessons and a continuous learning process and will set the right mindset within their teams and empower the individuals to go out there and collect the lessons, make the observations, and everybody will know what the priorities are for the commander. Obviously, it's always going to be operations first, but if he says, you know, it's very important, or she says, it's very important we have a lessons process here, and we learn, then people will go out and they will do it. If the commander doesn't mention it or actively avoids the lessons process, people go, "You know what? It's an easy life. I'll just do my operations and go home." And if, the trouble with an operation especially is if observations are not collected during an operation, **what normally happens is the operation finishes. Everybody goes home and disappears to their original headquarters, their original nations. And then when you try and collect lessons, and you go, "What were your observations during OUP?" Or whatever. I can't get a hold of anyone. There's only twenty people left out of a thousand people in the headquarters. And those twenty are disappearing next Friday, and they don't want to talk to the lessons guys.** And actually, probably, they don't know much because they're just the people clearing up. So it needs to a process that happens all the way through. Which is one of the battles we have because lots of people just say, "Oh, we'll do lessons after it's finished." But if you do that, it's too late because people have gone home, and people tend to forget the good stuff. And you end up with a list of, a hastily produced list of ten lessons: the food wasn't very good; get better beds; more toilet roll. All that sort of stuff, rather than the strategic operational key lessons.[26]

The commander who stands in the action body, he needs to accept this problem and understand, "Yeah they arrived and we need to do something about it." And, "This is me who's responsible." So this is really hard to understand sometimes for them, but they are responsible. Even though we are advising, but you are the tasking authority. Please task your action body. But if they understand, "Okay this is—should be changed, and I am the one who should do something so okay." In that case he needs to task. And if he tasks as I said so most likely to be applied. But it's about the commanders who are taking decisions.

. . . **If you are action body you need to understand and identify yourself. So it shouldn't be institutions identifying problems. It should be commanders, they need to have time, and they need to understand the lessons learned process** and understand they're all in that process because lessons learned process as commanders is really important. If commander gives a task, he has expectation. And if that expectation is not met, he needs to start investigation and to find out what happened. . . . So that's why control is necessary and he needs to—**If he sees that something there is a problem, he needs to do something about the problem. If not, nobody will do it.**

Sometimes we don't have [this] understanding or mindset because commanders say, **"Okay I have lessons learned officer, so he is responsible for identifying everything and for learning." No no no no no. The lessons learned officer knows the process. Everybody within HQ or within institutional entity needs to report problems.** Lessons learned officer only know, puts into certain format. And then brings back to the lessons learned board which is chaired by that institutional commander. And it's up to commander to say yeah

this is lesson. Maybe food was wrong during operation. Maybe fuel was wrong. Maybe not enough ammunition. Maybe operational plan was wrong. I don't know. And he need to accept and then endorse a signed action what is, and then implement . . . he could task institutions or experts to prepare some remedial actions or recommendations. **But the decision is to commander**. And he should ask his subordinates, "**Please report to me whatever problem you have**. Don't keep it. Report to me." It's also again, back to commander. So he needs to learn, he needs—I mean **he needs to want to learn and then he needs to do it to learn.**[27]

Table D: Quotes on JALLC Reports Not Capturing Strategic Errors

JALLC Does Not Capture Strategic Errors
I know we have a lessons learned, you know, with the JALLC. And **they have a responsibility for facilitating the collection of and certainly cataloguing of those lessons learned, and propagating those lessons learned. But to me, it's all NATO Headquarters.** NATO, you know, big NATO Headquarters, the NATO command structure and force structure, and all the nations have a responsibility [laughter] to collect the strategic, you know, operational errors and try to get at them. . . . I don't think we necessarily do a great job of identifying the strategic successes and failures systematically and then making sure after each operation, you know, we've captured them, put them aside, and move on.[28]
I don't think JALLC has ever produced, for example, a compendium or **a critical analysis of the lessons learned of the countries involved in this or that operation**. I doubt they've done it. No, but I didn't look for it. So I can investigate that. [. . .] did you do that kind of thing. But a comparative lessons learned, I don't think JALLC has done it. **One of the reasons being, by the way, that JALLC doesn't decide on itself what it's supposed to do. It gets its taskings from ACO, ACT, and potentially from NATO headquarters.** It has a program of work to which all the entities of NATO are invited to, for which they are invited to nominate topics. And there is a board that decides which topics are prioritized, how they, you know . . . And so, therefore JALLC, you are going to work on this or that.[29]
But a **real compendium other than the NATO crisis response procedures** that take in very detailed **which has to my knowledge has never applied in full.** Here's my very personal view: I think as with any military plan or any plan it helps to start assessing a crisis and start a process. But this is a very personal view.[30]
I don't want to be wrong because I might not have read everything, but they are very, let's say, smaller pieces of, you know. **It's not a strategic, high-end, what they do.**[31]
During the project, it might be that we discover that something have been a strategical error, but **from my own experience since I'm here, I've never had, I never was confronted to that kind of problem because I work on various subject like . . .**[32]
I don't think we have this kind of Joint Center to, for example, identify or even learn from political errors. So I'm sure that we manage to learn and to identify and to learn about military errors, for example, but I am not sure if we have anything, a tool to identify and learn to have some feedback about any political errors because it is pretty much more complicated to do that.[33]

We have the JALLC, which is the entity which sits in Portugal to do lessons learned. However, all that said**, it still needs a deliberate decision to say, "Guys, we've just had thirteen years of this. What shall we learn from this?"** And then, of course, the next question is, at what level? Is that the political, the military/strategic, operational? And the answer would be all of those, which you can imagine, that, for example, the political lessons learned can be rather touchy, so . . . Again, that requires a discussion and a debate and a **deliberate decision,** but the instruments are all there.[34]
In NATO we are supposed to have people who are precisely doing lessons learned. **We have the JALLC in Lisbon. So the idea so if people are doing that, probably we don't do that enough.** For instance on ISAF we never had a discussion about, ISAF is very fresh because it is only a few weeks ago. But as far as I know it's not foreseen for us to have any conversations about what lessons did we draw from Afghanistan. And probably this is a mistake because we should also try to do that.[35]
Know about JALLC but **not sure that they capture strategic errors.**[36]
My sense was **the JALLC was not as aggressive** as some of the national lessons learned structures we're cycling in whether they're tactical or operational lessons, linking it back to Allied Command Transformation and the centers of excellence to get some work done to set us up for the future . . . our [. . .] alliance is a system of systems, **a series of networks that are not perfectly connected**. But there are a whole solar system of orbits and things going on so that the JALLC, it's the one that announces the Lessons Learned Center, is a good institutional way for the alliance to approach learning things. But I think that's just the nature of it. **JALLC will never in a million years reach their full potential** because of the way they're organized and they respond to your request, "Hey, will you do a study on plant life in the Sahara" or something like that, that's what they respond to versus being out there with clipboards and everything is going on instead of say, **"Hey, what are you doing?" and being real-time.**[37]
Some of the lessons learned coming out of Libya, like in intels for targeting or joint ISR, were not pushed by the JALLC, at least from my perspective. But they were things that the [Military Intelligence] Committee decided to take on, so IMS sent SHAPE J2 and General Davis's predecessor would go to the MIC and all the nations would come and send someone. I think there's probably committees where there is a desire to look at these hard problems and keep them moving forward**. It's just that it's not necessarily always emanating out of the JALLC.**[38]
Not strategic errors but the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center, which is based in Portugal. But **that's military, primarily.** What tends to happen with other, at the NAC level, is they write reports and they may well use the JALLC to do them.[39]
[Another JALLC official referencing twenty-year lessons] We had been tasked to provide lessons learned regarding [. . .] and **we were confronted with some scarcity of lessons because from the strategic level, sometimes we didn't find out some levels in terms of the lessons that we needed to find.** . . . **Because the importance it showed about strategic lessons,** which means that this deals with strategic commands and also with the nations. You know that sometimes, sometimes there is a sensitivity to dealing with these kind of issues when we are talking about nations.[40]

We should be more strategic level. Sometimes we need to go a little bit deeper but it's at that level all the reports are.[41]
Reports Are More Tactical
Two centers—JALLC and ACT responsible for **how do we get this particular piece of software that didn't work. Similar story on civilian side—operational.**[42]
The JALLC papers focus on **tactical lessons**. In the committees of the NAC, we may discuss strategic lessons. Our operations policy is agreed at the level of the twenty-eight.[43]
I saw a couple of products from JALLC. Of course, there are different abstraction levels. Mainly those lessons learned are **tactical.**[44]
One of the papers I was very pleased with was more or less a guidebook of a commander in the field is **why I call this tactical.** I haven't seen anything which would mean support of the decision-making at this level. It could be that I have not run into the right documents yet. **Well I think they don't want it because I would say if you would have something that they have to sit in this headquarters and sit through all the decision-making process, I don't think they like it. That is my real, honest opinion.**[45]
They've done a report on the I think the last twenty years of operation, which is not bad. But I think the American one is better [. . .] General Flynn did a lessons learned, I think, ten year, on the last ten years, so Iraq and Afghanistan mostly. **They're a bit too tactical, I think, the JALLC.** I don't think we get into that business of, you know, we have terminated ISAF. **We have never had political strategic discussion** about what have you learned, bad or good, from this ten-plus years of major campaign that have basically transformed the way we operate together, the way we look at how operate outside the alliance, etc. There is this kind of **undercurrent discussion**, but it has never been kind of in an open facilitated way. . . . What I saw is the JALLC paper on the last twenty years. So it was well, of course, mostly ISAF, but I think also KFOR and a few other ones. **I think the products are a bit too tactical, which is useful for, I think, the commanders down to, you know, the operational guys.** I think that's useful to know, you know, what can be improved etc. in the whole procedures and so on. But it was **difficult to have the strategic political material** essence of it, if you want. **All we get is very generic** like, we need, I think, for example, for Libya, one, if I remember, was we need to formulate more clearly the end state. Yeah, okay. But you know, there is also a political kind of raison why sometimes you don't necessarily **formulate your end state.** So you need to be a bit, I think a bit less generic and a bit more—and a bit less technical. Yes. **I remember it was technical.**[46]
They are accessible on the, they are accessible on the Internet. **I read them seldom because they're awfully tactical. What we will call, tactical operation.** Yes. They're useful. They're useful for the units, the armed forces and such things At one stage, we were using, we were putting enormous effort in counter-IEDs. And that's where you see, where that's where you see, a strategy being driven to a certain extent, by, by, shall we say, by tactical issues. Because IEDs, the massive use of IEDs be it in Iraq, I know it's not a NATO operation, and later in Afghanistan have a strategic impact. That's when a suicide bomb [must] have a strategic impact, which is why they are being used.[47]

Was it really lessons learned? Yeah **It was technical stuff, not the strategic level.**[48]
Of course, I must say **I skim through the list** because there are a lot of topics that are not of immediate interest for our structures. But recently I have read things about **organizational issues and so on that were very practical things, in fact. About organization of staffs and so on.** No. For instance, defense staffs or larger HQs and so on.[49]
We, we very seldom take decision on our own. [We] may take decision of course, but we're always in between two things. **Our mistakes are more procedural mistakes, rather than conceptual. There were things wrong, or we're taking the wrong decisions. But as this is, that's not applied directly. And then, it is not so effective as to an organization that really takes decision.**[50]

Reports are more Operational

JALLC works for the military. It doesn't work for NATO headquarters. It works for the military. It's under ACT, and it works mostly for ACO, **and it does a lot of operational analysis more than lessons learned.** Actually, **they do operational analysis.** They will go and say, "Here is how ISAF was planned. Here is how it was executed, what went well, what did not go well." You know . . . No. **No, there's only one JALLC, but it's really very military-oriented.** Now, we have a lessons learned policy at NATO headquarters level that is approved by the NAC and that applies to all bodies across NATO. And this is how you collect, you know, you identify, collect, and assess lessons learned. . . . The **nations get all of the reports from JALLC.** Actually, I think a lot of the JALLC reports are available from the JALLC website. Many aren't classified I think.[51]
It's more **operational-level** lessons learned at the JALLC.[52]
The lessons learned system works well at the operational level. We never debated lessons learned at the level of the military committee. JALLC does lessons identified. We don't discuss the system and how the lessons learned process works. We talk about doctrines and standards but we are not discussing specific lessons learned.[53]
I think we have the, I don't remember the acronyms, the Joint Lessons Learned Center who identify, let's say, **more operational error.** They happen to make some **assessments about the over role operation about the political assistance.** But **I don't know really know or think that if we can speak about any lessons learned from strategic error. . . . I think they are more working on the tactical level. I never been it's in Portugal but the little I saw through their report are more, let's say, focused on the tactical/operational level. Even if they are making some other political assistant of situation, I'm not really sure if they are really able to get any feedback about the strategic error.**[54]
But again, this, you know, with **JALLC has produced these kind of—it's still, you know, very military oriented. No, not the kind of big political threat, no.**[55]

Reports are insufficiently analytical

The JALLC is **not an investigation center.** They do strategic level, say, they will look at, you know, three years of KFOR operations in Kosovo and say, "From what we have observed, this has worked well, this has not." **And, "This is our observations for future commanders,"** kind of thing. No, if you have something

that went wrong in the field, then it's really the chain of command through, you know, regime, law enforcement, inspector general powers and so to go back and find out what happened.[56]
JALLC has compiled a two-decades-long compilation of all lessons learned, from tactical to strategic. **It's a compilation of all lessons** from unclassified comments from CMX to tactical lessons from the field. **There is no analytical heft to it.** When you go to Lisbon, they may argue, "We're only supposed to draw together lessons." It just seems like a missed opportunity. . . . At the JALLC, it's old-fashioned ops research. We present math-sounding solutions to problems without a political answer. We need to be politically savvy. We don't do enough trying to analyze what we do. There are not enough political scientists.[57]
I've seen different, two times I've seen different reports from the JALLC, and they are not prepared to do lessons learned. They write reports. It's called lessons learned, but they are not prepared to. I mean, they don't have the human capacity. They have some civilian analysts, but it's not enough. **You cannot expect these people to be experts on everything, on every topic**. Then, you have lot of militaries that . . . I have no idea what. I was an officer. I mean, don't get me wrong. I have nothing against the military. But when they come, the nations don't really have, in their militaries, don't have these structures of lessons learned. Even if they have somebody who is administering a database or something like that, **you want these people to be analysts—to understand, to go beyond what is visible.**[58]
One commander of ISAF requested an analysis lessons learned on corruption in Afghanistan. He asked . . . headquarters in the US. So they did quite a good analysis with the lessons and the recommendations. . . . A year before that, the previous commander . . . asked the JALLC to do an analysis on corruption. . . . If you compare the two lessons learned reports, **the JALLC one is very general, very fluffy, not much substance and not much, not many recommendations that can** . . . I mean, yes, we need to more training. Yeah, okay. **Do I need to do a lessons learned to know that we need more training on corruption in operations? No.**[59]
Frankly **the ACT should be our—at least within the NATO command structure—our lead** on capturing strategic analysis on campaigns, success and failures. ACT at writ large **because I don't know if we have the analytical brain power there [at JALLC].**[60]
JALLC making all such kind of things, but some of the documents are **covering not really deep these questions. . . . Some of the [JALLC] documents are distributed twenty-eight for twenty-eight, which means for all nations. Some of them for a group of nations.**[61]
We are **not subject matter experts**, so when we have to work on the subject we have to learn everything about the project.[62]
JALLC is the institution who actually **looks into those "not met" expectations.** I mean it could be not met expectations so expectations I mean—**or results exceeding expectations.** So we look into both cases what was good or what was really bad in order to understand what was the root causes.[63]

Table E: Quotes on Time Needed to Produce JALLC Reports

I'm not sure whether the outputs of the JALLC whether these products help or **how quickly they are able to kind of produce a product like that.** I've seen some JALLC documents and I kind of **vaguely recall that the time distance between the phenomena being described in the document and the actual release of the document is kind of large.** Well, maybe even years. I'm not sure about that.[64]
Sometimes it's more in terms of procedures, you know? The response times and things like that than more in terms of the big strategy. You know, sometimes it's more the implementation than really the strategy that you might face some problems in some areas that where really the lessons learned are very important.[65]
The point with the JALLC is yeah, it's there, but it tends to be bureaucratic. That is my accusation. **So after the report, it turns into a dead bureaucratic process. That is the danger we have with all of the lessons learned. So it's not hot material. So it's dead so people look at it, say, "Okay, fine. Put it down." No, it's not old. It's because that is the nature of lessons learned—because they are important. They should be hot but since the current activities are so frequent and high, and the hot air is here, all that is—let's say—past is not relevant, which is wrong.** I don't support that view, but it is not putting into the forefront.[66]

Table F: Quotes on Geographic Disconnect on Elites' Ability to Report

There is a NATO lessons learned center—it's called the JALLC. **I don't know them** but they are the keepers of knowledge on operations. . . . If I have a researcher looking at a particular conflict, I would hope they can go to get the JALLC reports **but we don't have much of a direct link with them.**[67]
We do have a lessons learned procedure. That is also something fairly recent. **I mean it's always been done empirically I think, but to be done in a more concerted, methodological way. I think that is more recent.** No. I can, but I, you know it's, as **it's not something that I deal with it,** directly.[68]
There is also a formal process through the JALLC. You're going to go down and see the JALLC. **I don't know** a huge amount about the day-to-day work that JALLC is doing.[69]
NATO has some mechanism to how to record that. And then lessons learned are sharing and giving the— There's a databases on the NATO level or on the nation level. So it can be recognized. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. **Yeah, there's a webpage. There's a program of software available that you can share the information, what is, you know, lessons learned, and what you learn. And you want to share with the others not to make the mistake. I think it is through JALLC, yeah. Yeah, through JALLC.** Yeah, yeah. **I'm not familiar with because my staff working on that,** So I have [. . .] is back home so I am here. It's my first day, so.[70]
Now you've caught me because **maybe it happens but not in a very visible way and I'm not sure.** And maybe they sometimes send some reports about their assessment. But I'm not very familiar with how it happens.[71]

In NATO, yes. Because we have this command of which **I've forgotten the name,** it's in [. . .] it's doing nothing else. Yeah. Oh is it in Portugal? JALLC. Indeed.[72]
Well, yeah. There is some countries, they having the mechanism. The **NATO has some mechanism to how to record that**. And then lessons learned are sharing and giving the—There's a databases on the NATO level or on the nation level. So it can be recognized. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. **Yeah, there's a webpage. There's a program of software available that you can share the information, what is, you know, lessons learned, and what you learn. And you want to share with the others not to make the mistake. I think it is through JALLC, yeah. Yeah, through JALLC.** Yeah, yeah. **I'm not familiar with because my staff working on that.** So I have [. . .] is back home so I am here. It's my first day, so.[73]
I think it's still called the JALLC in Portugal. **And they are on paper responsible for lessons learned.** I don't know. **It's all leadership driven. Sometimes they've had good leaders in the past, and they've done really good job, and sometimes they've had poor leaders and** . . . But I don't—**I have not worked with them in a while to be able to give you a fair characterization of what they're doing.** So I don't want to be, you know, unfair to them by saying one way or the other. We did some Libya work, so that might've been the last time we did stuff on Libya. But I'm not—but to be honest with you I'm not sure if that was even involved the JALLC.[74]
We don't have a VNC in JALLC so **it's hard to maintain a connection with that agency.** There is a Division of Civilian Preparedness.[75]
If I need I can go there and find this, but I think they are little bit, **they need to update. They need to update this**. When we tried to research, to analyze this lessons learned database, we realized that they have some lessons learned which are already, you know, past. **We need better interaction, and communication with them** as well.[76]
There is good interaction with the JALLC but largely military, because they are part of the military chain. More difficult for the International Staff to get there, and it's probably the ops—you know, we're probably the ones who use them the most of all the other International Staff. I mean political staff . . . policy wouldn't use the JALLC. Even Defense Planning and Policy, very seldom would use the JALLC. **They do their own analysis of requirements for capacity development and whatever.**[77]
What could persuade people to change their behavior? It's hard to see how the JALLC as a separate organization—**that is so far away physically from NATO HQ—**could mandate change.[78]
Having served three years in a NATO capacity, I see that **there is not a good link between the national constructs and JALLC**. I don't feel like there is much momentum of JALLC.[79]
JALLC works directly with Norfolk. They usually come once a year. . . . **Usually, the JALLC business is being done directly to JALLC, to headquarters in Norfolk, and I'm just monitor [in Brussels]**. We do nothing. But sometimes, we have to do things here, when especially when the JALLC business has something to do with this headquarters. Just imagine for a second that the JALLC director was asked, that he has been [. . .] to come here and to report on something to the military committee, for instance. And then, he becomes in a way, also my responsibility, and I also have to prepare his engagement with the military committee. **I have to introduce his work, and introduce him.**[80]

Well, we are humans we need to sometimes to interact first then we work better through VTC or phone conference or things like that. Depend on the level of the sophistication of the subject . . . **You know travel back and forth to Europe** and fly six hours to have a two hours meeting and fly back. **That's painful.**[81]

Allied Command Transformation surfaced from being **geographically disconnected** from this place. So—It definitely has consequences because you are not able to nurture the relationship with ACT and the, you know, to the same extent you can with ACO, **which is just down the road. . . .** ACT as well because of its entirely different nature as a Allied Command from ACO means that they are not—they are never going to be as currently relevant as ACO as a, you know, as a name and place. **Allied Command Operations is the one doing the day-to-day business running of the alliance, defense, and security. ACT is doing that in a different way.** They're doing the exercise, they're doing more the mid- and long-term planning. They're working on stuff that is, you know, let's say, **not as immediately action-oriented as ACO will**. So **both the nature of commands and then also the geographical distance of ACT makes life a little bit difficult or, let's say, more challenging for ACT.**[82]

I don't trust the military, especially ACT, especially JALLC with coming up with anything political, strategic, and I don't think they have any one civilian working for them. And the military some of them are really fine and excellent but I just think **it's such a different world they're living in and I don't think they understand politics all that well.** Many, some do, some do. But I don't think they grasp and I'm not saying that I do and they don't, **but I think you need to be here in headquarters and feel it and have a sense for it. And have a sense of what you're looking for in terms of political strategic lessons to be able to do it. A problem of geography,** but you know, some of our IMS colleagues and SHAPE colleagues are not all that better in grasping. I think it's just a mindset and rotations also. Those who are in headquarters are here for three years and they go.[83]

Theoretically it should be the JALLC, but the JALLC is subordinate to ACT. ACT is in Norfolk. ACT is not responsible for operations, and so it's difficult. JALLC does some great work but in some cases it takes too long and **it's disconnected from the people**—[. . .] did a great job on some lessons learned that we did for Libya. But it took him going to the JALLC, going to Norfolk first, then going to the JALLC two or three times to help guide them along because they're, you know, **they're good officers who come in, or good analysts that come in, but for the most part they've never been to NATO headquarters. They've never seen a councilman. They've never seen a Military Committee meeting. So they don't completely understand how things are done.** And some of the implications, I mean, the results are good but it's not you know—and I don't know what the answer is.[84]

Allied Command Transformation surfaced from being **geographically disconnected from this place. So—It definitely has consequences because you are not able to nurture the relationship with ACT and the, you know, to the same extent you can with ACO, which is just down the road.**[85]

Well **officially we don't communicate with NATO headquarters**. Because our higher commander's ACT [. . .], so in a hierarchical organization like NATO, we should, we only relate with our higher commander right, or with other entities that are at the same level as we are, like [. . .] or JFTC. But of course that's NATO HQ, we

do have a lot of communication with **NATO HQ,** because, either because **we go there for training,** or **we go there to give training,** or **we use them for data collection**, or they are **stakeholders to some of our reports**, or they are **customers to some of our reports**. There are different ways we communicate with them.[86]

Figure F: Elites' References to the JALLC (by Institution)

Chapter 4: See No Evil: Reflections on Errors in Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine

Most Frequently Cited Strategic Errors in Interviews

Afghanistan
Too many civilian casualties
Decisions were uninformed
Insufficient resources
Flawed decision to intervene in Afghanistan
Pulling out too many troops too soon
Miscellaneous
No strategic errors occurred
Publicly announcing end of surge

Libya
Lack of long-term plan for after intervention
Prefer not to answer
No strategic errors occurred
More countries should have been involved
Miscellaneous
UN failed to intervene after the NATO operation
Insufficient target ammunition
Should have initially been a NATO operation
Flawed decision to intervene
Western countries should not impose democracy on non-Western countries
Civilian casualties

Ukraine
Failure to update strategic concept
No strategic errors
Prefer not to answer
Failure to provide more troops along border
Miscellaneous
Too slow to react

Afghanistan

Table G: Quotes on Civilian Casualties as a Strategic Error in Afghanistan

For Afghanistan. It's a lessons learned, best practices, lessons learned on preventing civilian casualties, mainly from Afghanistan.[87]
[*Author: Were there specific references back to the experiences in Afghanistan*?] For example, the let's say zero tolerance approach to civilian casualties and our operators directing the aircrafts always looked at the possibility of civilian casualties and when those became likely, the operation specific operation was stopped. [*Author: And this was not the case in Afghanistan?*] No.[88]
For example, our bombings, night raids into civilian houses, all these civilian casualties that we produced through the false use of military force and so on and so forth. Mistakes after mistakes. But we each and every time that is the let's say, what is the bright side of the organization here, we are able as twenty-eight democracies to correct mistakes and not to repeat them, and to learn from mistakes.[89]
In 2008, I think it was July or August, we had an instant where we had, at the time, ISAF, working with the Afghan commanders, went to strike a group of known Taliban targets, and used, you know, excessive force, and it resulted—knew they had some civilian casualties they caused and thought it was in the single digits. They actually thought it was four or five, and in terms of killed, civilians killed along with them, a number of twenty or so insurgents. But they didn't take the time to do a thorough, you know, inspection of the damaged, basically, compounds or houses, and as a result, **after they left, we knew that the Taliban forces and others came in and exposed the fact that there were certainly, you know, dozens of killed that were underneath the rubble. And I say excessive force because it was usually air strikes.** AC-130, this is all in the public domain, so nothing, you know, classified here to be concerned about. And so the counter claims came immediately that now there was upwards of seventy to ninety killed, and **there was no way to control the information because [. . .] ended up being controlled by the Taliban insurgents and not by local forces,** to include the provincial chief and provincial governor. So there was lost control of that area, in fact when we went back and did multiple investigations and found that, in fact, we had killed more than five, but it wasn't the numbers that had been used, and they manipulated graves that were dug, but not filled with bodies. [. . .]. And so we went and got the hole, went down a whole rat hole of issues that we need to respond to. **Some that had to be responded to, and in terms of—that was a tactical error in terms of the use of excessive force—killing the folks we were supposed to protect, killing, you know, innocent civilians, and then taking an excessive amount of time to get out the truth**, and then also resolve it by changing how we employ air fire and changing our tactical directive, etc. These are the things that resulted afterwards, but that lost critical support from UNAMA and the UN country team members, some of the ICRC, and other human rights advocates. And it took us, you know, a great deal of time to recapture confidence and willingness to cooperate and coordinate. And that led to a bunch of reactions to improve

our ability to avoid casualties, track casualties, and then control areas for thorough open investigations, rather than abandon them to anybody else other than, you know, local authorities to exploit. . . . So my error was we had not already thought of the tactical guidance for restraint and application of force. And it led to what ended up being a series of instances where the whole force had to **learn, over and over again, the use of indirect fire and air strikes to avoid, frankly, what was a self-defeating, you know, narrative: that we use excessive force and didn't care about the civilians that we were meant there, you know, deployed there to protect.** So that there was the strategic error. **Probably that was a tactical error that had strategic consequences.**[90]

Table H: Quotes on Insufficient Resources in ISAF

But when the same military structures of SHAPE ask for force generation, it was minus X-thousand troops. After second it was, okay it was 10,000 minus, after that it was some thousands, and today still, the United States have to provide a lot of soldiers to cover the gaps which are not filled. Strategic error is—militaries would like to do the job for political guidance, but the same political guidance would sit— our [defense] ministers come in one room, and agreeing, back home, "No money? No deployment," and only some very narrow approach to that. **We don't have strategic interests in Afghanistan.** We will provide a small team and [over]. . . . And again, probably I was in real field was a lot of errors happening. This is between political will and military reality and military advice. When you're telling the militaries to do the job, and military is saying we need at least 30,000 people in Afghanistan, or at least [forty-thirty-thousand], and politician making decision 12,000 is enough. "You are professional, you can do that," but when **we as the military saying we cannot do this with 12,000 people, and political will not accept, we have to do the job. Result is now the Afghani troops what we have prepared, they are really good, but they are not so good because some force enablers are not available to them**. . . . Now we are in Afghanistan. When you are losing territory, you are losing villages with people who were in governmental side. **But after our politically correct approach, we are training them as democratic defense forces**. **They are not working robust enough.** When Islamites come in, they are so different again, they are killing they are collecting children, killing ten of them and saying, "Okay next time when we are coming and you are not with us, we are taking another, but hundred of them," with ISIL is saying. And this is totally different cultures. We're training them to be in Afghanistan, to operate as [one nationality's] soldiers, as [another nationality's] soldiers, but they have to operate in totally different environment. When they are caught from bad guys, no way for them to survive. All governmental military [. . .] or police men are normally shot. And this is creating a fear.[91]

One of the big areas of strategic failure is logistic—how to organize logistic in the territory of Afghanistan. **Strategic becomes strategic when we really see how much it will cost.** And probably you know the worst case in our example. Why all airplanes have to be refueled before entering toward Afghanistan airspace. They are landing in Georgia, in Bulgaria, in Turkey, fully refueling, taking two

times less slow they can fly, and without refueling, flying back, because each liter of fuel that we are bringing to Afghanistan is brought by airlifts. You take an airplane, a refueling airplane, and moving this to an appropriate place, and the cost of this fuel is, even for United States military bill check, it's very difficult to accept how much it will cost. When we are speaking about one platoon, or one squadron, this is millions. But [it turns] this logistical operation in Afghanistan became a huge logistic operation. . . . **When you're paying two-thirds of your money for logistic support** of what you are training some platoon, company, battalion, brigade**, it really has a strategic impact to the quality of job, and how you're spending your money.**[92]

The question is how to stop the . . . possible strategic error? Okay. The military voice is the military committee. So military committee is preparing military advice always. But the political, the strategic political decision is always taken in the NAC. If we will go there and what will we do there and which goal we have to achieve there is a political decision. So and then the military committee is preparing military advice, how to realize this decision, if this is possible or not. What's the risk? What units do we need for this? And **sometimes we are a little bit angry because the politicians try to involve in the military knowledge with the—because of the money, because of the different political interests, go there with not with such a big forces.** But it's too expensive. Do this with, okay. They sometimes limit us, so the intervention could be, the intervention should be limited. That's the case in Afghanistan. When the politicians from the European continent and American continent limited. Yes, the next operation will be limited on 12,500 troops. So when we prepare the military advice, the military advice was a little bit bigger group. So we have a little bit conflict situation with the politicians because we told that the goals which should be achieved in next period of time, which was also limited, was not. **I mean, on our opinion, we should have a larger forces, for example. And that's always discussion.**[93]

And so **it's also pressure game.** It's nobody pulls up the guns at their first draw and then you keep on pushing and see how solid is our military with adjustment as well. And then with many politicians with [giving] them a death sentence, [they] have waited for us to give in but we didn't even. We should have unfettered military advice because in the end you send the commander out to do his tasks and he has, **we have to give him the means to do it.** Yeah.[94]

Figure G: Seen a Lessons Learned Paper on ISAF: Question 14

Table I: Quotes on Absence of Strategic Errors in JALLC Reports on ISAF

They're a bit too tactical, I think, the JALLC. I don't think we get into that business of, you know, we have terminated ISAF. **We have never had political strategic discussion about what have you learned, bad or good, from this ten-plus years of major campaign** that have basically transformed the way we operate together, the way we look at how operate outside the alliance, etc**. There is this kind of undercurrent discussion, but it has never been kind of in an open facilitated way**. Interestingly, we wanted to have that [. . .] because there was a whole push back. **But basically Ukraine crisis came in the way. And that would have been in a kind of . . . Had Ukraine not happened**, I think the Wales agenda would have been more open and more, you know, but . . . defining the future of the alliance. Ukraine kind of defined the future. No because when we raised that we had done, we wanted a kind of political strategy document on you know, ten years of, twenty years of operations lessons learned. It was even difficult to explain what it was to the permanent representatives when there was some early discussion. They were like, "But what are we doing to do? Are we going to go about the enlargement or [. . .]?" There's this typical kind of a bit discussion creep where you can never stay focused on what you mean, which is we've done, you know, almost non-stop large and medium operations over the last ten, fifteen years that have been transformative. Time has come to [. . .] show what they mean for our forces and for also our political way of operating.[95]
In our lessons learned workshop that we put together on ISAF, [*redacted name*] agreed that we didn't see a strategic assessment of what we or frequent partners or allies found profound. What did we learn? We learned what were lessons specific to Afghanistan that were never solved, what were generic lessons for future operations, what did we do wrong given what we knew at the time and with the information that we had at the time. (The latter were not Afghanistan specific.) The findings were fixated on problems with the operation, as we specified it, rather than the situation on the ground. Why? The

operation was based on an objective. **These objectives changed as the operation went on but the objectives were never updated.** Negotiating changes would be too difficult politically, even though they no longer reflected the realities on the ground. It was a Norman Dixon moment.[2] There was variation among the desires of the delegations. The Nordic countries had huge aspirations for human rights changes. These desires of the nations were both positive because they were ambitious and negative because they were harmful. For example, indicating that soldiers should go talk to women in people's homes while the soldiers are still getting shot at. **Instead of the nations taking a least-common-denominator approach to objective-setting, there was an additive creep. They got really ambitious**. See Saideman's book. Even if you don't commit countries to risky jobs . . . Iceland is not going to complain. Spain had the same say in the objectives even though neither of these countries was participating to the same extent. Even after ten years, ambitions are highly aspirational. Let's presuppose that structure needs fine-tuning. But hope is not a policy.[96]

When I see lessons learned reports on operations like Afghanistan, where we didn't have lessons learned policy in NATO, [. . .] set 2003, **we didn't have a by-strategic command directive on lessons learned**. We didn't have an ACO directive on lessons learned. I think lessons learned from ISAF, whether they be military or political, are actually more difficult to distill.[97]

Well **the first one [lesson on ISAF] was very technical procedural**. Eh? It was the one on the crisis response system and how we reacted to it and how we could do better at it. How committees could do better, which are all important. The **second—and actually there is a military planning aspect to that as well**. So how could that have been done? The second was the main JALLC report which was largely not so much tactical but probably more operational, and maybe military-strategic. And then the third one, which I think I can't remember but I think was a **JALLC product with a lot of IS input and guidance**, you know, in some cases wrote a lot of it for them and gave it to them and they then—the commander cleared the new formats and sent it back to us. And that was where a lot of political things were done.[98]

Table J: Quotes on the Use of Networks and Private Documentation for ISAF

It might be discussed informally. Where, I mean, it might sort of appropriately come to the NAC is if civilian casualties or the risk of causing civilian casualties meant that the commander decided that he should change the way in which he carried out his operation and if that actually meant that there needed to be a change in the operation plan, unlikely because the operation change is quite strategic. **It can also I suppose come to the attention of the Council if it becomes a political issue.** I mean, if, you know, you've caused civilian casualties and that's raised with NATO in the form of a letter from the prime

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[2] Norman Dixon was a psychologist who authored the book *The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, as well as other scholarship on perception and preconscious processing.

minister of the country affected to the Secretary General, he'd probably have to share that with the Council and the Council might give him some direction.[99]

There were **some discussions** about hey guys, how do we learn something about after thirty years of involvement, thirty? Yeah, probably, 2001. I know how many years of involvement in Afghanistan. Have we learned something? What about, let us look at the issue. And that was a discussion to the military committee and to right now we have a analysis requirement. But that one didn't come from the military committee. I mean, did the military committee say, "Hey JALLC, do that"? No. They were following the chain of command. They were discussing, they were going of course to the IMS. IMS was saying "Hey. Who is the specialized body for doing this kind of analysis. It is JALLC. And then JALLC is what related to whom? To ACT. Let's ask the ACT to do that." And this is, but there is this, this is quite a [. . .] **I would say between this because there are the discussions.** . . . But honestly at the end of the day, if you really wanted to track, to trace the origins of something, you go to the fundamental papers, to NAC decisions, to MC decisions. That's right there.[100]

If there was some information that was retained on that. I mean, there were memos that were written about this situation but I don't think that it's necessarily been discussed at the Council level, as it probably should have been.[101]

Libya

Figure H: Outcome of Libya Operation

N=30

Table K: Quotes on the Success of Operation Unified Protector

I think the operation itself, you know continues to be judged as pretty successful. I mean there were sort of errors of execution along the way. You know, I think some problems with strategic communications. But the, you know, how I felt that the operation to its conclusion was a success. If there were strategic errors, it was in the follow-up—the failure to either take on or push some other institution to take on a more robust post-conflict stabilization role.[102]
I was thinking from an Air Force perspective, we kind of labeled that operation as a tremendous success because, from a tactical point of view, the [national] Air Force, is the one of the participating air forces, was able to execute all the assigned mission. Hit all the assigned targets without any casualties on our own side and with limited collateral damage. So **at the tactical level this was a huge success.**[103]
I was about to say—Libya is generally viewed as a successful operation with no strategic errors in it.[104]

Figure I: Working at NATO During Libya Operation: Question 7

Figure J: Seen a Lessons Learned Paper on Libya: Question 8

Figure K: Circulation of Lessons Learned Paper on Libya: Question 9

A	Do not know
B	Publicly available
C	Miscellaneous
D	I could access it if I wanted to
E	Those with access to NATO Restricted
F	Those with access to NATO Confidential
G	Those with access to NATO Secret
H	Commanders
I	Those with access to Cosmic Top Secret

Figure L: Why No Post-Intervention Plan in Libya

A	NATO did not want boots on the ground
B	EU and UN did not want to be involved
C	Libyan opposition declined further engagement
D	Did not answer
E	Miscellaneous
F	Lack of local knowledge

Table L: Additional Examples of Strategic Errors in Libya

Libya has not turned into the desired end state. [It] was we do this thing in Libya and all of a sudden it turns into a functioning democracy and the guys who were—who should have guns and law enforcement activities have patrol over the whole country. If that was the desired end state, we didn't get there yet. You could call that a failure but I'm not sure if the strategic error as much as it is a little bit of fantasy in what an air campaign can accomplish. So there is still talk about that. Was it a good idea or not for the alliance to intervene in Libya? That is a reasonably common theme. . . . I'm sure there was some discussion about should we doing this at all and the decision was to do it and so off we went.[105]
NATO is very often accused of having launched an operation without a clear end state, and I think the situation now is Libya somehow reflects this lack of end state. So that was possibly a major strategic blunder. It was and we cannot hide from that. And I think have we learned, has NATO learned its lesson, I think yes. I think nothing alike will be launched in the future within the same context. . . . I go back to what I said before it's very difficult to identify an error at this level. It might be a conflicting element between the political and the military, but so if we want to call it an error, okay so be it. And in which case, I would say that no single error in my experience has been repeated twice.[106]
What's not implemented for many different reasons including, first of all, the refusal by the transitional national government so the Libyan Transitional Authorities didn't want to see in Libya a massive, sort of

say, presence or a massive effort of the international community—not necessarily NATO but also the others because they probably under the impression that they could have dealt, be able to deal with the consequences with the situation by themselves. There was probably also some kind of force expectations that, I mean, expectations that then proved to be wrong. Similarly, expectations by several actors of the international community, by the nations themselves that indeed they thought, "Okay, Libya is a rich country they have a lot of resources, six million of population that will find a way to preach a [. . .] to words and to normalize the situation they will be able to deal with this." And this is the main reason I can say that is definitely very much wrong, but I think this is what happens. Certainly, I can tell you because I was part of those negotiations and talks, I can tell you for sure that the **Libyans were not in favor at all of a big presence of the international community so this is what happened but this was very big strategic mistake, I would say, because then what happened it became very clear, and now it is completely clear, that the Libyans themselves could not do that.** And of course, it requires ages to really be able to think in terms of good governance, had to put in place the infrastructure that you need, the governance structure and so on. So money, yes, is of essence but resources of course are of essence but probably the country did not possess sufficient expertise.[107]

So I come back to Libya, it was always clear that we were never going to put anyone on the ground, which is fine during the air operation but is not fine for what comes after the air operation. And the exclusion of that option because of the [old] lesson that we learned from the so-called lesson that we learned from Afghanistan, which was that it's painful and difficult and doesn't necessarily meet your goals, was unfortunately not the right lesson in my view for Libya where we should have had personnel. "We" being somebody, not necessarily NATO personnel, on the ground because there's a window of opportunity and you lose it. And in Libya we lost it. We had a moment where we could've turned it around. But it wasn't just us. We didn't want to go in. We also didn't have a Security Council mandate. We also didn't have support from Libyans who wanted to start their own new life without outside help, but I think they could've been convinced. I think we could've done it on invitation from them and not needed the Security Council resolution. So there's that.[108]

Ukraine

Figure M: Reasons Provided for Establishment of a VJTF

A   Reassure Eastern allies that feel unsafe
B   Miscellaneous
C   Need to be able to react quickly to Russia's hybrid warfare model
D   Deterrence

Table M: Quotes on Failure to Update Strategic Concept

If it involves the major powers, that tends to drag it towards a strategic situation, yeah. And I would say I would give ticks in the box Georgia as a second order effect because we have Ukraine now but I think there is a clear line from Georgia to Ukraine. 2008, Russia got away with it so that with military force we can change the situation around our borders. They rearmed and on a beautiful day last year they acted. So**, the mistake was in Georgia but the second-order effect is what makes it strategic.[109]**
If you look at the—and you should, at the strategic concept. **Take Article, or Paragraph VII, which states that there is no danger, and paragraph—I don't recall, 33 or 34, about Russian-NATO relations. Those paragraphs need to be revised and very, very soon. But read them and you will start laughing because that was a bad assessment at that stage . . .** Of course, what to do? What to do to deter, because once we start the aggression, we were owed, let's say, having failure of the international policy at the highest level.[110]
Russia looks at us as an adversary . . . they have the ability to mobilize at very short notice from within a so-called snap exercise overnight.[111]
If take the Strategic Concept of 2010, it says very clear, the European Union Atlantic Area is at peace with itself and its neighbors. And there is a long chapter on the strategic partnership with Russia. **Well, it doesn't live up to reality anymore.**[112]

I mean, **to be brutally frank, it's not strictly speaking NATO's problem.** And so therefore, there was never a moment when a Russian attack on Ukraine, bid the annexation of Crimea or operations in eastern Ukraine, was going to lead to any NATO military response. **It didn't cross anybody's mind that we might go to war with Russia over Ukraine**. . . . Our response has been to say, looking at what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, looking at everything else the Russians are doing and saying, do we think that Russia's behavior has fundamentally changed? **Do we think that Russia is a potential adversary? We won't say that publically, but in the private, of course, we think they are. And do we need to do anything to deter?** And the Readiness Action Plan, the very high readiness task force which is just a part of that Readiness Action Plan, the adaptation measures, the assurance measures are all designed to do the continuum of four: **first to protect; secondly deter; thirdly defend; and fourthly defeat. . . .**
And there are lot's of other things which go on: rhetoric; exercises in the Baltics and Poland; increasing the number of AWACS flights; and **all of the other signals that you can send to the Russians that we don't trust them and we're watching them very carefully.** Some of which is done—**a lot of which is done by NATO**—but not all.[113]

I think the strategic error would be maybe **misreading the objectives and strategies** or end goals of potential opponents, which I think is a case of the current Ukrainian Russian crisis or has been for some time, for at least the last five years with the Russian Federation in general. And so that would probably be an operations and then the overall posture kind of geopolitical equation. And so those would be strategic errors, misleading—misreading sorry—the opponents in one case, and secondly ill-defining the goals and objectives with regards to the environment where the goals and objectives should be achieved or be striving for.[114]

I mean, strategic errors, you mean from a position of a NATO? Or you know—this goes back a long time. You could, with the benefit of hindsight, say that **making overtures to countries like Georgia and others to discuss, as was done quite a few years ago, a path to membership of NATO, you could consider, again with the benefit of hindsight, not to be such a good idea.** But remember that was at a time when Russia supposed to be, or perceived to be, a partner. So was that a mistake? Yeah, afterwards.[115]

Table N: Quotes on There Being No Strategic Errors in Ukraine

We have not made any mistakes at all. We have been united. We have made no mistakes. We have the wedge-driving attempts of Putin. . . . We have all acted in a very mature, reasonable measured, unexcited way. . . . We can be proud. Our nations can be proud that we have not, that **we did not turn into the victims of the Russian attempts to divide the West.[116]**

I agree that NATO should not get involved militarily in this conflict because that would really mean Third World War. The procedures, the velocity or the quickness or lack of that can always be questioned. But I think more or less **NATO acted quite quickly** in strengthening itself as much as possible, but in the proportionate way without going too far and maybe becoming provocative. So I think that was a question—

how we can **strike a balance between showing strength at the same time not becoming threatening to the outside world, especially Russia.**[117]

The stimulus is an error that you recognize and you set out to correct it if you are set to repeat it. For the case of Ukraine, nothing falls into the category of error because **NATO does not have a direct response on Ukraine.**[118]

The only comparable crisis management effort is really the one that we did on Georgia. And actually that does influence discussions. And we of course have also member states that keep reminding us of that effort at the time and keep pointing out that we should not make the same mistakes again, at least as they perceive them that we have made then.

. . .

So you know we decided, "Ah we're going to suspend this NRC now, the NATO-Russia Council." And when that same discussion started to come up last year—was it in March?—when the Crimea thing happened, many many voices from nations but also inside the [. . .] let's look at this back then. Back then we all thought it was a good thing or generally it was a good thing and it turned out not to be a good thing because the key problem was we had suspended this NRC cooperation knowing that at some point we're going to have to come back to it. And the step to come back to it would be so significant, would be a step that probably we'd be unwilling to take now with Crimea. And so we intentionally, this time we thought about this. Look, sooner or later there is going to have to be dialogue again with Russia. Nobody disagrees with this. But do we then really want to make the symbolic decision that something that we have done in reaction to Crimea is now being reversed? No. Probably not. So let's not make that decision at all. **Let's just say we suspend practical cooperation but we leave this forum open so that if we want to talk we can avail ourselves of this forum,** knowing that probably we won't before quite a long time but we don't have to make the symbolic thing. **And that was a lesson learned in Georgia. It was the right lesson because we hurt us. When we pressed that proverbial reset button with Russia, it basically meant, well you know this Georgia thing was really not serious.** And it sent a signal that when we talk about consequences there really aren't any. After two years, we're back to normal. And so that was a lesson learned for Ukraine and the reason why we've done it subtly different this time.[119]

It's for that the Russians have made twenty-eight nations, NATO, their enemy. We, the Russians, have made us their enemy. If you read the latest revision of the Russian strategic doctrine, **they define NATO as their enemy**. . . . And if the most three fair referendums observed by everyone in the Crimea for independence, they would have got it in ten years and then after two years a referendum carefully observed by everybody to join Russia. They would have had it! Instead of this they have now twelve years of cold war. **So, yeah total strategic errors but that was on the other side.**[120]

Table O: Quotes on NATO's Speed of Reaction in Ukraine

And in the case of Ukraine we found out that our response was not speedy enough. The Russians, they acted very quickly in unpredictable, you know, way. And so we thought, okay, we need to address this. And how to address it was, one way was to have this force that is very high readiness force. We have our reaction forces, but was needed to shorten the reaction time in a crisis like that. Part of the work is that, yeah. Because this was a task also from a NATO summit from Wales.[121]
Things are changing very quickly. And so the reason why I was speaking about time at the very beginning of this interview because I think that time is really key. So **strategic is a question of time**. **So if you don't have time, you can not take any strategic decision. Even at the very high political level**. . . . The SACEUR is the NATO military chief but he has also US cab because he's leading the, he's the top leader for the US forces in Europe. So his reaction towards the Ukraine crisis might be different from time to time because sometimes he might have a US approach and sometimes, for different reasons, for regarding European pressure, he may have change, his perception towards the Ukraine crisis may have change his speech during a press conference for example because he may have to take into account the German perception, the French perception, because **you have two vision of the Ukraine crisis. You have the European vision who try to, let's say, deescalate the crisis**. And you have also the US vision perhaps, the British vision, **which try to be more in conflict with the Russians for different reasons, because for the Cold War** because you have most of the politicians who are in their sixties or even more, sixty-five years old, they have all experienced the Cold War so they are in the spirit to fight a new confrontation with Russia. So the perception are really different. And sometimes **NATO is really linked to those two different perceptions.**[122]
I was attending the Wales Summit. . . . The Wales Summit was originally planned to be a success story about Afghanistan. That was initially the summary of the previous Secretary-General's reign as the Secretary-General. . . . And surprise, surprise, the world is not sleeping. Ukraine, the Russian invasion which was not for many months here called the Russian invasion. We were talking about some aggressors. **I had the situation with the military committee where one of the presenters, I would be euphemistic now, said, "Are we really sure that those green little men are Russians?" I shook my head and I said, "For God's sake, they are not Chinese. They are Russians, let's not pretend here."** Of course, there is big interest. Germany, big economic ties with Russia. Resources. France with Strauss and so on. **The countries which were slowing down the reaction and the countries like us Baltic countries and those in the proximity who were trying to speed up the reaction but no doubt that they pushed it, hoping that that would survive for [. . .] everybody made the same mistake with the strategic course**. Started to dominate the next NATO summit.[123]

Table P: Quotes on Using Interpersonal Networks in the Case of Ukraine

Well I think that among the staff, **the conversations I was hearing is people were saying why aren't we doing more?** We have these skills we have these capabilities, we should be there. But what we heard in the Council was this is not for NATO. And there is really, on the staff—and you know I am completely and totally biased because I am part of the staff—I have found over the time that I've been here there are really dedicated really smart really expert people on the staff in a wide variety of areas. When I found this was **during the Georgia crisis . . . I went literally around the entire building looking for people who could help and I found amazing expertise and tons and tons of people.** I can help with civil emergency planning. I can help with air defense. So the staff all want to be active and to do stuff and to operate. But many of the allies are not convinced that NATO has those capabilities or they want other organizations to take the lead. And whether that organization is the UN or whether that's the EU.[124]
If you have an issue that you need to discuss before going to the NAC, [okay], **you call the office that has produced this document and get some more explanation for that. And from my personal experience, they have been very, very supportive.** Yes but each of us are correlated together. **So nothing stops me to go to civilian staff, or international staff and ask a question. And I have done that for several issues** and they have answered, you know. I think the support that you get from both International Staff and International Military Staff here is excellent. . . . Well I don't have regular communication with International Staff, but **when I had to clarify some issues, I had with Deputy Assistant for Operations, for example. He helped me.**[125]
Yeah. **Politically, we started discussions about the lessons learned**. On the other hand, the situation is so dynamic that **it's difficult to draw some very precise lessons for the time being,** you know. So the situation is **evolving so fast that** . . . But I would say that I personally think that the issue is also from this perspective, that we need to learn our lessons and then see what we can do to prevent the bad things that happened and to improve our prevention capabilities, our awareness.[126]
All the things that NATO is doing came from SACEUR. They originated here. That's a really important piece to understand the US role in an alliance decision-making on matters pertaining to Europe. It's a key part of the transatlantic feature of this alliance. And it goes back to Eisenhower being the first SACEUR. Now when the—so, you know, **if you take a kind of a doctor's approach to problems set in the international field, think of it as having to have twenty-eight doctors. Before they're going to agree on a surgery or a course of medication, they've got to agree on a diagnosis. So SACEUR actually is the doctor who provides the diagnosis. Or as we did in the case of Ukraine, provided a framework for developing a common diagnosis.** And so again, that was to break the Ukrainian problems set down so that it was understandable and manageable and then communicate that framework to Brussels in the NAC. So I developed the framework for looking at the Ukrainian problem set. And we called it three, basically three-in-one. It's very simple: Crimea-Russia, Ukraine-Russia, Russia–rest of

the world . . . **The strategic challenge was to have a better crisis management center.** We developed that. So that's just sort of what we do.

Normally, there are some papers that are produced. We get, as I told, regular briefings on the situation, and then the International Military Staff, they produce you know, papers, and these papers go in the working groups. We have many working groups for operations, for C-2, command and control, for personnel, for logistics, for trainings. Okay, so these papers that are produced. They go there, they try to find consensus in the working groups. So our experts participate, they are trying. If they don't find consensus within the working groups, they bring this issue in the military committee. And before we discuss the issue in a military committee, we get also the opinion of our Ministry of Defense, or General Staff for that issue. And then [we trust me], that position in the military committee. **But for crisis in Ukraine, we had many, many discussions because it was not a small issue.** It was a very big issue for NATO, so the security environment has changed. Has changed a lot. That crisis has changed the equilibriums. **I think that's the biggest break in the security environment after the Cold War. And yes, we talked a lot.** Especially, how to address this. So Ukraine is a partner. It's not a NATO country. But it's close to the NATO border.[127]

We are constantly assessing the situation there [in Ukraine], aware of the mandate or the role that the NAC thinks it needs, or doesn't need, think need NATO needs to play, yet at the same time making use of our ability to do prudent thinking. **And I don't know to what extent you've been introduced into that realm, but we can think—not plan—think without political approval. And we make full use of that.** And only this morning did we have a command group engagement to describe to them the latest state of play in two sessions and will carry on tomorrow morning. And then **we all go into what Russia's next steps might be,** could be, what the international reaction to that might be, and then what NATO could possibly do were that to happen or not to happen. So we are trying to be ahead of the power curve very much so, but **again, always fully cognizant of the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member, is a partner, and that there are, you know, definitely no-go areas at this moment in time.**[128]

There is a lot of thinking and **there is talk about should NATO have somehow prevented the annexation of Crimea? So there is talk about that**. It's an interesting question that is not relevant to things nor is it possible. It's interesting from an academic standpoint, but the alliance was designed to provide security from any imaginable [. . .] to every single country all over the world and Ukraine is not an ally. Ukraine is a partner. Russia is also a partner.[129]

But as an intelligence officer, it's very difficult because I don't really have substantive intel to point. It's all a guess. And you know, you generally need some threads of intelligence to support your overall assessment. So it makes it, when you don't know your overall adversary's intent, it makes it pretty difficult. So that's the, you know, quandary we're in at the moment . . . I just **talking to the Germans and others—is the way to overcome some of this** is you're **never going to have absolute clarity on the intent,** but we certainly can do a heck of a lot more in improving our collection capabilities and our penetration of the enemy. And we **need to restore a lot of and improve upon a lot of the capabilities** that we used to have, and we don't have much time to share.[130]

Maybe we were too confident on the, you know, after the Cold War [. . .] our special relationship with Ukraine—not only with Ukraine, but also with Russia, etc. And then cases like Georgia and Ukraine and maybe others in the future have surprised us more than should have been. But **this is a reflection that I can do it personally, a reflection that I have heard from my fellows even at the table.**[131]

Table Q: Quotes on Using Private Documentation in Case of Ukraine

But of course, when we discuss Ukraine in a formal basis among perm reps, what we have in mind is more what happened in Georgia, and the way that the crisis management aspect of that crisis, political crisis management of that crisis. So that's what we have more in mind. **And that's the kind of lessons learned. Non-written. But of course people try to remember what did we do back then in Georgia. What was the Russian response, the Russian reaction? How did they interpret it?** Certain aspects of the agreement then in the medium term, we have problems because of different interpretations. So that is more what we have in mind**. It's not because we did a lessons learned exercise. It's because we have in the back of our minds, of our institution memory, that example**. **So we more or less compare notes. So we don't do it in a kind of structured manner.** But certainly its presence is there on everybody's mind.[132]

We certainly haven't done a formal review of lessons from Ukraine. **What we did do in the wake of Georgia though, was a bunch of analysis of that, of the Russia-Georgian conflict back in 2008. And when Crimea, Ukraine blew up, one of the first things we grabbed was that bunch of analysis.** Yeah it was. And we still are to a degree, although we've updated a awful lot of that now, obviously. Yeah, absolutely. And **one of the things that we were able to do when, in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, was to dig up an awful lot of the reflections back on Georgia—sort of two years worth of work after that, of analysis, of what is now being called "hybrid warfare" and the Russian approach, Russian military model.** Obviously, Georgia was a much earlier version of it. But a bunch of lessons being extracted from NATO and what it implies or for NATO's reaction should've been happening in an article five situation. So on and so forth. So when all of that became important again in the aftermath of Crimea, **we had a body of work from which to start.** Yeah, yeah. No, no. It was useful and it was useful far beyond just the sort of "I told you so" type thing, in that it really did frame people's analysis of what was going on in the early stages. It was—now you know, the degree to which it was useful depends on the

way you were sitting in all of this. But I **thought having that work a hand at being able to reach back and grab it was extremely useful.**[133]

As I told you the International Military Staff is the core of producing, I mean the paperworks that are distributed. Drafts, after they come from the strategic commands, or they can produce their own draft. Okay? So this is the engine, let's say, the initial engine, okay? Because someone need to write a draft. Okay? So they are the ones that produce the draft. And they are composed of us, of nations. Okay? The members of the International Military Staff, they come from nations. So all [. . .] are represented there, on different positions of course. And so, after that this paper comes to the working groups. Well we also have our experts there in the working groups. And then after they work and work on these drafts, if they reach consensus, they bring to us. Even if they don't reach consensus, they also bring to us and we try to find consensus within the military committee. If It's not possible, then we send it to NAC, because always there is the NAC that has the final word, the final say.[134]

Chapter 5: Hear No Evil: The Informal Processes of Sharing Knowledge of Errors

Process Tracing Tests and Additional Discussion on Methodology

Process tracing can be understood to mean "the use of within-case observations of causal process or context to derive or test a causal explanation of a case-level outcome."[135] Fairfield summarizes Collier's process tracing tests as follows:[136]

> *Straw-in-the-Wind Test:* Passing the test increases the plausibility of the hypothesis in question but does not confirm it. Failing weakens the hypothesis, but does not eliminate it.
>
> *Hoop Test:* Passing or "jumping" through the hoop increases the plausibility of the hypothesis but does not confirm it. If the hypothesis fails the test, it is eliminated.
>
> *Smoking-Gun Test:* Passing confirms the hypothesis. Failing does not eliminate the hypothesis.
>
> *Doubly Decisive Test:* Passing confirms the hypothesis and eliminates rivals.

I use these tests to examine different causal process observations (CPOs) in order to verify each hypothesis.[137] Collier, Brady and Seawright define CPOs as "an insight or piece of data that provides information about context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference."[138] Validating particular CPOs is necessary in order to verify "the evidentiary value of a causal-process observation itself."[139]

In process tracing, a scholar must consider: if the hypothesis is true, what CPOs should we expect to find and what CPOs should we not expect to find? Using the four aforementioned process tracing tests, I assess each hypothesis against evidence from structured interviews, official documentation, observations and scholarship. I use different CPOs depending on the test.

Evidence for Proposition 1: Institutional Design Explanation

The following discussions of findings from process tracing tests correspond with those CPOs that were listed in Chapter 5 but did not have an asterisk (*).

IS is Facilitating Institutional Memory

Table R: Quotes on Role of International Staff in Developing Institutional Memory

There is an institutional memory between us here, us when we rotate, with the IS colleagues who have been there for a longer time.[140]
There isn't an institution per se [for institutional memory]; we have [an] informal lessons learned institution in a form of the old-timers. There's no other way of putting it. The people that worked at the IS for a long time.[141]
I think this in, in that regard, I would say that, definitely, this is the IS side, the political side, who should really look into this [institutional memory]. And they have different committee frameworks who, I think, are well suited about that.[142]
Institutional memory is in NATO civilians. When I leave [soon], JALLC will lose a lot of its corporate knowledge. I have been here ten years.[143]
Each new member who comes to JALLC, in the first month they receive the training about how to do joint analysis and how to do, how to manage the projects. So this is kind of institutional training provided to the newcomers, and this training is provided by NATO civilians who work here. They are actually continuation because their tour is much longer than ours. Ours is three years, with extension four years, that's it. And they just work permanently so they can be a kind of continuation.[144]
We rely mostly on people. The corporate memories usually maintained, preserved by the NATO civilians—the few NATO civilians that we have in various places.[145] So far all the NATO civilians that have been contracted are still here. And it is important to maintain that, because they are the younger ones who will be able to maintain some kind of continuity, because as you know the military rotate out every three years.[146]

What is important . . . in all NATO entities is that the civilian personnel—the NATO civilians—are many times the ones that they provide continuity and core point knowledge within the organization because they've been here sometimes for eight, ten years, twelve years. Some of them since when the JALLC was created. So when you lose one of these civilians, it is a problem. And then the new one gains that knowledge, but not all of them go at the same time.[147]
Our civilians are so important regarding this corporate knowledge, and we are using them in order to transition that information necessary from the cooperative information necessary for someone to be a good analyst.[148]
The International Staff have the benefit of having people that are, well, at the moment about 80 percent of the people are on indefinite contract. That's a legacy of a previous Secretary-General's decision.[149]

Institutional Memory Develops Through Informal Processes

Figure N: Development of Institutional Memory

Development of Institutional Memory

Elites Maintain Strong Relations with the IS

Evidence from interviews concerning the communications of the IS provide further support for Proposition 1. If the IS is the institution actively engaged in the development of NATO's institutional memory, we should expect to find evidence that the IS maintains a wide-reaching professional network within the organization. Interviews confirmed this, irrespective of whether

the elite was a senior-level military officer at ACT in Norfolk, an ambassador in Brussels, or a military staff member at ACO in Mons. Such connections are needed for non-IS elites to trust them with knowledge that they share through networks, private documentation, and simulations. Of those non-IS elites who volunteered information on the subject, the majority (88 percent) indicated that they did have regular communications in their interpersonal relationships with members of the IS, as seen in Figure O. This particular CPO should be understood as increasing the likelihood that Proposition 1 is correct.

Figure O: Interpersonal Relations with International Staff

N=24

Interpersonal Relations with IS

In interviews, elites from across different institutions based in different states cited their reliance on the IS for guidance in assessing the past to plan for the future. For example, one elite described his/her professional relationship with a key member of the IS:

I take a series of judgments from people whose judgments are with respect, to get

my arms around the problem, the situation so you can describe it accurately. Here

at ACT we would then take it into a number of fora. . . . I speak to the Director

General in the International Staff in headquarters NATO on a reasonably regular

basis and we've had sort of private sidebars on a number of issues where we've just tested things out, tested our prospectus and worked out where we go from here, so to speak. And the where we go from here is either diffusing a situation by all, collaboratively getting around, making the adjustment better or soften the problem.[150]

This evidence of interpersonal relations is appropriate for a hoop test rather than a doubly decisive test because of what would have been the consequences in the absence of such evidence. Without evidence of elites' interpersonal relations with the IS, Proposition 1 could not be entirely ruled out. It could have been the case that elites rely on the processes developed by the IS without being aware of the fact that the IS initiates and maintains them. Nevertheless, most elites did acknowledge directly and indirectly the influence of the IS on processes of developing NATO's institutional memory. Thus, I can argue that this evidence increases but does not confirm Proposition 1.

Process: The Role of Informality

Informal Processes Exist at NATO

The presence of informal processes within NATO provides slight support for Proposition 1. Proposition 1 further rests on the assertion that, as indicated in premise 1 of Chapter 2: "Elites in IOs predominantly use informal processes to contribute knowledge" in the construction of institutional memory. Recent scholarship has testified to the existence of informal processes within the crisis management decision-making and planning apparatuses of IOs. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, a growing body of scholarship has explored the multi-faceted ways in which informal governance characterizes IOs from the IMF to the AU to the EU.[151]

NATO is no exception. In a 2016 book, international security scholar Vincent Pouliot identified informal processes of "social gatherings outside of formal meetings" at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Pouliot described coffees and lunches where elites spoke "openly without (or beyond) instructions," and he identified the tradition of having a Tuesday meeting between NATO's secretary general and permanent representatives.[152]

During my research at NATO headquarters, NATO elites also referred to the Tuesday meetings as an opportunity for frank discussion. I observed the dining room where they occur. Sunlit and complete with linen-covered round tables, the room appeared as if it were designed to encourage open conversation among elites. Elites said that they used the weekly event to prepare their political positions for the weekly Wednesday NAC meeting.

Certainly, informality is a common way of doing business inside NATO's headquarters. Yet observations of elites engaged in informal discussions say nothing about their content. Evidence of the existence of informal processes only passes a straw-in-the-wind test. It is insufficient for confirming Proposition 1. Such evidence only slightly increases the probability that the hypothesis is correct. These observations of informal processes in action do not clarify whether—or how—they influence institutional memory.

NATO Has a Relatively More Informal Culture

Evidence from my observations and my interviews conveyed a broader sense among elites that they considered NATO to be an organization with a relatively more informal culture than other IOs. With respect to observations, I noted that NATO has a unique physical environment that makes it particularly conducive to informality in interactions. Elites

own discourse also characterized NATO as an organization with high levels of trust among colleagues. I briefly discuss each of these pieces of evidence.

First, NATO's political and military headquarters provide unique physical environments that can support informal conversations about the present and past of the organization's crisis management operations. Among IOs engaged in crisis management, the organization is unique in its layout. All national delegations, NATO's leading institutions and agencies are co-located in the same physical space. As a counterexample, the national delegations to the EU are in their own independent buildings strung along the Rue du Loi in the heart of Brussels. In New York, the national missions to the UN are scattered among the high-rises southeast of Park Avenue.

Unlike at other IOs, NATO's ambassadors, delegation staff, military representatives, and civilian and military staff of the IS and IMS all dine in the same cafeteria, café, and restaurants. Laity aptly observed that "the corridors and conference rooms of NATO HQ are excellent venues for the debates and horse trading needed to produce agreements under stress."[153] Elites at NATO greet one another in passing in what feel like never-ending hallways. They go to the same gym. They swim in the same pool. In 2017, NATO will have moved across the street to a new political headquarters that is said to have even more and larger common spaces. An hour outside of Brussels, NATO military leaders and staff similarly occupy the same common areas at the organization's military headquarters in SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

Second, interviews with elites provided further evidence that NATO may have a relatively informal organizational culture. In order to feel comfortable enough to discuss real errors, NATO elites would presumably need to share a high level of trust. To explore levels of trust within NATO, a team of independent coders hired as research assistants coded discourse in transcripts of the interviews to identify references to subjects' degree of trust in his or her

colleagues at NATO. Coders categorized these into three classifications: high, low, and quid pro quo. The subcategory of quid pro quo referred to the elites that viewed relations as serving a purely instrumental purpose. Figure P illustrates the results of coding.

Figure P: Trust Among Colleagues at NATO

A	High trust of colleagues within NATO
B	Low trust of colleagues within NATO
C	Trust in quid pro quo relations

Higher levels of trust provide further support for the argument that the development of institutional memory would proceed through informal processes. This CPO passes a hoop test since it increases the likelihood of the hypothesis. I cannot, however, use this evidence alone to confirm the hypothesis since it does not point specifically to memory-making or to the role of the IS.

Elites described the organizational culture as one in which individuals had to conduct much of their business through informal discussions because of the nature of NATO's business. As one elite described, "NATO is a, basically a, policy, political military alliance, but with a big military component."[154] Therefore, in both decision-making and retrospection equally, elites preferred informal channels to avoid consequences for politically sensitive knowledge becoming

public. Another elite said simply, "As you can imagine for NATO being a multinational military establishment, well actually it's a political organization, but it can be hugely sensitive."[155] A third elite described the importance of flexibility in the face of so many formal procedures:

> International organizations tend to have their in-house mindsets. . . . There is a number of givens and a number of ways to think and a number of procedures to translate one part of your philosophy so you need to be careful that not the internal procedures and the internal way of thinking is too strong. You need to have a bit of a laid-back attitude to ask yourselves, "What am I doing and is this in relation with reality?"[156]

Operating in such a politically charged environment, elites sought out individuals whom they could trust. They had to be individuals willing to quietly share and receive knowledge about past errors.

Mechanism 1: Transnational Interpersonal Networks (TINs)

Figure Q: Overlap Frequency in Your Institution: Question 20

N=80

Figure R: Overlap Length: Question 16a

N = 51

Table S: Quotes on Old-Timers as Knowledge Guardians

We had informal lessons learned institution in a form of the old-timers. There's no other way of putting it. The people that worked at the IS for a long time. I know quite a few of them because, even though I am not an ambassador and I had not been posted to NATO before, I wrote about NATO. That's my expertise. I wrote about it for fifteen years. I used to come to headquarters maybe for when this was a parking lot before enlargement. So **I knew a lot of the old-timers on a personal basis long before I came here. And the lessons learned that I was given came from the members of the staff who were around forever**. Problem? NATO stopped about eight years ago stopped giving permanent contracts to people. It now forces people out after six years. Ninety percent of them. There's exceptions, but more than 90 percent, something like 95 percent of people leave. **The old-timers that are here currently are close to retirement and they are the last of the kind. Virtually everybody else who works at NATO headquarters, the IS staff, will be forced to leave after six years. They serve one to six of their tenures and they never stick around long enough to become old-timers. Which just about guarantees that when another crisis breaks out five years from now there will be zero institutional memory of Libya because by then those on permanent contract at the time of Libya will have all been retired.** And a much greater proportion of those . . . Far many more will leave between Afghanistan and five years from now then they left between let's say Afghanistan and Libya. I'm expressing myself very inelegantly, but what I mean is you can think of sort beginning of Afghanistan in 2003 or 2004 [. . .] in 2010 and hypothetical new crisis in 2015. Between 2004 and 2010 quite a few of the IS were still old-timers. So there was a lot more of this informal institutional knowledge. But between now and say five years from now the proportion will drop even further to virtually nothing. So **we are losing the informal capacity to retain lessons learned because we are losing the old-timers. That's an issue because I wouldn't know what to do if I didn't turn to the old-timers. It's one thing to read a manual. It's another one to actually sit down with somebody who is there and tell me so**

this is what we're trying to do. This is what the manual says. We've found that it doesn't work at all. We can only get that from someone who was there.[157]

All of us here, most of these officers here in the house, are at least forty years of age, so you are not talking to the uninitiated. There's a huge body of knowledge here. People who have spent decades in Africa or other conflicts**, sharing that information here with one another—w**hat's happened, where **they feel they've gone wrong, debating that, and having that discussion here.**[158]

We use NATO civilians or contractors to try to balance the rotation tank because of the military rotate out every three months. So **we have a bunch of civilian people** here that remember the studies **ten years ago, five years ago, and they have a big knowledge about NATO.** And so we had some contractors, and they were, they have decided not to continue having contractors, to have NATO civilians for those posts.[159]

He was also an old-timer from NATO and we had been in different positions. Just, and talking to each other for different reasons. So, so we knew each other for **at least ten years.** And we had known each other, and we had worked together, even for [. . .]. So, we knew each other. And then, I was here with him for a week, in which he really passed all the good information. And, [. . .] that was with, still as I said. When you look at NATO, from a different angle, it looks like a different animal. Even if you had had many, many more than a decade experience, in NATO. Direct NATO business. But it looks like a different animal. But **knowing how it is being seen from other angles helps you normally to very rapidly expedite your getting up to date on that so it didn't take me very, very long.**

. . .

So you complete it in about six months, and **you start with the most, those that you need to have first, knowledge, and military representatives, ambassadors, Assistant Secretary Generals, and then little by little you complete your. And that's, and then it's up to you really, how. Up to you. I usually deal with the Assistant Secretary Generals, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary Generals.** So the ones, I'm, that I talk to. I do not go, usually, below that level because those are the staff officers, who talk to them. **But I try, I also, I visited all of the Assistant Secretary Generals, of course**. And those Deputy Assistant Secretary Generals that work on Allied Command Transformation issues. Not those that work on things that we never touch, because, it's pointless. I mean. Some of them, I've been meeting them in other occasions, but I did not make an effort to visit them. Well, that was the case before. **Now, since Strategic Command is becoming one of the most relevant things in the [wrap], it's getting another dimension, so also, we also need to be in contact with them.** Yeah, yeah. Absolutely. Absolutely. Well, I mean, I'm very much in contact with the Defense, Planning and Policy Division in the International Staff, and the Defense Investment Division. Those are the two ones that I'm most in contact [with]. A little bit with the Emerging Security Challenges, as well. But the other two, completely. I know them all. All the deputies. Oh, everybody knows them, because we have very, very intense relations with them. [Laughter.][160]

Today, if you want to know, you know, I don't know, let's say, we restructure the International Staff. We recreate a division with the focus of this. You know, **it might be a gray head around the organization who might say,** "You know what? That's exactly how things were like twenty years ago. [Laughter.] We'll go back to that." "Okay, well what happened?" Okay, so then you talk to the person. But there's no book to go and read and say, right, this is what happened twenty years ago. Even if there's some nuggets on what did we learn and what not and why?[161]

I was going to say nine years and since 2004**, a whole bunch of us on indefinite contracts. Some people will be there thirty-five, forty, forty-five years**. So—not much chance of aggression or lateral movement. So that's one and they realize that. They're looking at how to get more of a career management system. I was in the military. I was told to go someplace. I had a chance to negotiate, but in the end it was that's where you're going. And I always had the last word, which was either, "Yes, sir," or "No, I quit."[162]

I was up at NATO for the monthly Strat Com working group. But **I mean some of these people, I've known ten years, or more**. No. They're more my level. Yeah, so I mean, **ASGs you tend not to see a lot.** ... I mean ASGs are, **some of them are very approachable and some of them aren't. Some of them have their day planned to a minute, and others hang around.** I mean, sort of going back to my time as when I was working up there, **if I wanted to see an ASG and I was an A-5 then, I just called them up.** There's, there is, I mean there's a lot more formality here, in a military environment, which is what you'd expect, than there is in the environment there. But you know, national things come in. **Some of the more Soviet-era nations still have a level of formality which other nations don't, but, equally, some of the European, Western European nations call everyone by their first name but are anally retentive and stuck up. You know? It's just disguised by the name. You know? First names, but don't you forget who's boss. The informality hides the real power structure.**[163]

We have here people who are here since the beginning of the JALLC. So the NATO civilian who are working at the JALLC since 2002, 2003, so they have a huge knowledge not only about the JALLC but NATO. **They know everyone. You know, NATO civilians is a small world, and when you are working at the strategical level, you meet a lot of people. Then you establish a relationship, exchange regards, and then at the end of the day, you know everyone.** So that means if you know, **if you want to have some information that you know that information exists somewhere, but it's difficult, just send a mail or small phone call and say that you've got some ideas. So that will help.** And even if the military are rotating every three years**, you have also the national chain of command.** I'm the French SNR, the senior national representative for the French here in Portugal. So if I want to have something, I can also contact my chain of command, French chain of command who are at ACT and say, "Okay, I would like to have that information," and I will take it and then go to ACT. So there are many ways like in every organization, there are many ways to get the information. **If you want to have the information, you will find it, of course. So you will receive it, but, you know, the staff process is sometimes a little bit heavy [laughter], just to be polite. And then the rest of the time, if**

you really want to have something then you will go to other relationship you may have: because of your nation, because of your personal relationship, because you know that guy, and you kept in contact, and because you are here since years and years, and then you ask people from some nation who are here in NATO for three, for four years, then came back to the nation and then come back to NATO. France, for the time being, we are in this situation where we don't have so many those kind of contacts because we, how you say, quite new in the military organization, but it's something that we are building as the other countries. Yes, you may know people everywhere.[164]

You know, you come in here, and **This is a business where you tend to run into the same people.** You know, I'm posted here now and **I would run into people that I, you know, we used to work together or we ran in same circles ten years ago or fifteen years ago, whom I've encountered, whom were you able to establish beyond the professional good personal relationship with.** So despite there being, you know, these, you know, the geographic and political proximities, you may actually run into. . . . **Now I have a colleague from another nation that actually was somebody you hit it off with well when you were both serving in Washington, DC, fifteen years ago. By word to that, you're good friends, you have better relations than you do with other most of your colleagues, and you have the personal trust that transcends the geographic or political boundaries. Obviously. So those are the wildcards in that game.** Normally it's really these geographic and political concentric circles. And that sort of diminishes as the further away you go. I assume this is the same with everyone. It's particularly glaring for us because, for example, in the Military Committee, I admit there are only twenty-four hours in the day and it's just, you know, there's only so much you can do. . . . It's easier to talk to, you know, in the same manner it's easier to break the ice with my, you know, Nordic colleagues in the IS, IMS. You know, not to have anything against the others, it's just that, you know, we may have run in the same circles before in a different capacity. Or you know, I'll go to the [insert nationality here] head of, you know, Logistics and Resources in the International Military Staff because he and my predecessor served together in SHAPE, you know, three years ago, and through that connection, "Hey, that's a good guy. You should really—you should make sure you connect with him properly," etc.[165]

Figure S: Descriptive Statistics of Elites Targeted

```
 Variable |    Obs     Mean   Std. Dev.    Min     Max
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
 Frequency |     67   1.776119   1.265161       1       7
```

Figure T: Frequency of Elites Targeted as Knowledge Guardians

Figure U: Histogram indicating Age of NATO Old Timers

Figure V: Frequency Table Indicating Nationality of NATO Old Timers

```
. tab oldnatl

    oldnatl |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          1 |          1        2.44        2.44
          3 |          1        2.44        4.88
          4 |          4        9.76       14.63
          7 |          1        2.44       17.07
          8 |          1        2.44       19.51
          9 |          2        4.88       24.39
         10 |          2        4.88       29.27
         11 |          1        2.44       31.71
         12 |          2        4.88       36.59
         14 |          3        7.32       43.90
         19 |          1        2.44       46.34
         20 |          1        2.44       48.78
         21 |          1        2.44       51.22
         22 |          1        2.44       53.66
         25 |          3        7.32       60.98
         26 |          1        2.44       63.41
         27 |          7       17.07       80.49
         28 |          8       19.51      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |         41      100.00
```

Note: About 17 percent of old-timers were British (code 27) and 20 percent were American (code 28).

Table T: Quotes on Role of Interpersonal Networks in NATO's Institutional Memory

Working in a staff in an international organization, in which you need to deal at strategic level with political organizations and not only with the military side, you need to engage with different nations [. . .] so, it's really very important to build a network. . . . In any kind of work that you are involved in, networking is very important, but in this specific case in which you have a huge handover of people, it's even more important because you cannot start to build your own network to assist you on the job that you need to perform. You need to pick up the network that already existed, and the network from your predecessor in order to be capable to continue the job. Otherwise, you will be in trouble.[166]
At the end of the day, if you show a little interest in the job, you have the information. If you don't want to have information, you don't open your computer, and you sleep during all the meetings, and you will be very quiet and very easy. . . . It's like in every organization, like in every nation. As long, as soon as you show a little bit productivity, then you have the information. [. . .] that within the JALLC it's [. . .] we have a better reason and information is disseminated. Then people are doing their fair share with the information what they want too.[167]

If I have to relate to NATO HQ because of my previous experience in other NATO jobs, in a way, I do have a default coming into this position: my own network that I facilitated during the integration in this particular position, which is more difficult when you come to a NATO job for the first time.[168]

There is an International Staff we have to coordinate with. My counterpart division is the IS Ops Division, we are IMS, and there is a politically and civilian-led IS Ops Division. The earlier and the more transparent and open-minded, more coordination on a daily basis, it is better in the end product. The very good drive, the very good, should I say, facilitator from this cross-divisional work is [Elite B]. In these, always, we find on one hand side the IS Ops people and on our side, the IMS. This is an open door type of policy approach to work. A civilian diplomat, perhaps, working on political issues, on the area of operations. For example, it has got a system counterpart, a military person, professional military person qualified from field experience and all that. They can meet on a daily basis, just going next door, and talk to him, listen to him, and prepare a memo on that. It is required for the Secretary General. It is a very, in many cases, very informal and here and there necessarily also formalized but very informal setting that makes a lot of difference.[169]

I'm just saying that [the network] helps to realize how people who don't wear a uniform think and what their value system is. It's not about age. It's not about rank. It's all about what you know and can bring to the table. [For example,] we had an issue whereby there were people from the CCOMC, which you may know or not know, we are comprehensive, we have civilian analysts who have their own network. They wanted to go to the UN right at the time when there were NATO-UN staff talks. Somebody thought that was a big problem. I did not because you're talking about, sort of, you know, Assistant Secretary General level for the formal meeting, and here worker bees go in to see their buddies in New York. Reached out to IS, good colleague, high up the chain, said, could you please talk to so-and-so and, you know, make sure, you know, this is the issue, this is the agenda. Called back a day later, "Not a problem, go ahead." Not a show-stopper. It's very easily solved.[170]

It's really incumbent on the leadership. And **the Secretary General had some responsibility to identify when something didn't go right** and therefore take steps with the staff and the nations. Because **in some cases, it's the decision of the nations. And to point it out diplomatically to the nations because they're your boss. But on the other hand, they need to know of something, so you do it diplomatically and "delegately," but even that's what the process is.** The Assistant Secretaries General, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries General, and even Section Heads, Staff Officers. You know, if they've seen something, they should point it out.[171]

We have **never recorded that or established a lessons learned diary** if you wish. The Ops Division may have, and JALLC as well, JALLC lessons learned very much so I would suggest. But **this is based on my own memory and recollection and my daily work with my collaborators [. . .] and also my daily—not daily—but regular discussions with the nations in the committee which I am chairing**, which has been the Defense Policy and Planning Committee in this building. Or with our participated as a NATO staff member in Council meetings, I witness the discussions there.[172]

We rely mostly on the staff that doesn't rotate to ensure the transition, that summer, usually the transition is done in the summer.[173]

Secondly for us, as with most of the others, everyone will cultivate a particularly good **relationship with the US**. **Why? They're the biggest ally, they bring the most to bear.** They have the most assets, and their voice carries the largest weight within any deliberation within this alliance. That's just a fact of life. If the US is not onboard, it's not going to happen. Or let's put it severely less likely that anything would happen. So we all cultivate, try to cultivate a good relationship with the US.

Now we try to cultivate a good relationship with anyone, but this is just sort of, in the concentric circles of—not importance, it's just, you know, plain, you know, trying to manage your time and resources, it would sort of go in these concentric circles outside. And it's geographical and it's political. Those who you have already the **closest relationship** with, you know, based on basically geographic proximity and political proximity, **that's where you start**. Naturally I have closer relations with my Nordic colleagues than I do with my—and my Baltic colleagues—than I'd have with my, you know, Adriatic colleagues. **Now but then again, as well with, you know, the joker in this or the, what do you call it, sort of the rogue agent in all of this is also then basically personal relationship**.[174]

Figure X: Information from Predecessor upon Arrival: Question 23

N=82

Figure Y: Predecessor's Mode of Communication: Question 19

N=65

A	Face-to-face meeting
B	Phone calls
C	Written exit document
D	Emails
E	Notebook or binder
F	Miscellaneous

Figure Z: Overlap with Predecessor: Question 25

N=69

Figure AA: Civilian Elite Overlap in Institutions: Question 20

N=10

Figure BB: Military Elite Overlap in Institutions: Question 20

N=8

Table U: Quotes on Information Received from Predecessors

I'm the third NATO ambassador here [from my country] both of my predecessors are also members of our career of foreign service, so I know both of them. I spoke to both of them.[175]
If you have very good relationship with the person that you are going to replace, everything is much more easier of course. Because [my predecessor] didn't hide anything. He was very transparent. And also, he felt very comfortable on sharing with me all his weakness and strengths. Physically introducing and people, and phone calls and emails. Like with the ones that we were not capable to contact physically because they were not working here in Belgium, like in the NATO HQ or SHAPE. He sent an email to them, introduce me, explain, tell them a little bit about me and requesting support when I was going to do, and afterwards I also sent an email to those entities and those

persons. And I mean you know, at least start to engage with them. And that is I can tell from my experience, that is technically the only way you can minimize the problem.[176]
Yeah, all this is no problem. I know him very well. He was our previous deputy chief of general staff, so we had some years working together before. So it's no problem. Even now we have a good relation.[177]
Well we had about a five-day window where we both, you know, I was basically his shadow in terms of getting information, but **there's no overlap in the Military Committee.** So there can only be one of us there. So there is no overlap there, but there is an overlap of some kind of a turnover. But when I came into this job, that turnover wasn't necessary because I was in the IMS, so I already knew all of the issues.[178]
"How does it work—NATO?" That, you can learn this at home. But the specifics, you know? What's going on? How does it work in real? Where is the power? Where is, where are, who are the decision-makers? Then, the interactions between the countries. Who is advocating what and what's the ongoing problems at the moment? And what's the opinion of the different nations about this problem. That's, let's say, important information for the beginning. The theory how does it work? You can take a book and do the homework back home in Slovenia. . . . When you are here two weeks in the same office [with your predecessor], okay, he told me, "Ah. You know this [Person X] is very nice guy, so he's very helpful." Yeah but not officially.[179]
He left me an envelope, a sealed envelope. These are the instructions and the codes for all the complex communication gear you have there. Don't ever ask me to explain to you how they work. [Laughter] And that was all. No, no, we don't have this kind of tradition or anything, no.[180]
My predecessor was a contractor from the Center of Naval Analysis. . . . He was seventy-three years old. He had spent all of his time planning weekend trips with wife. **The only plans that he left behind for me were some reservations for a trip to Porto.** I never met him. I got an email for him at one later saying, "Hey do you want to go on a cruise this spring?" I forwarded him the email. He'd been gone about a month.[181]

Informing Multiple Colleagues about Strategic Errors

Survey results on elites' responses to strategic errors support elites' statements on the value of networks. Rather than reporting through formal processes, elites turned to informal processes of sharing the knowledge of the error with trusted individuals. Most elites reported that their first response to a strategic error was to informally discuss with colleagues in their professional network in the organization. Figure CC and Figure DD indicate how elites prioritized the

importance of informal discussions before any consideration of reporting to supervisors or taking

other actions.

Figure CC: First Response to Strategic Error: Question 3

A	Discuss issue in division
B	Notify supervisor
C	Raise issue with close colleague
D	Miscellaneous
E	Notify IS

Figure DD: Second Response to Strategic Error: Question 3

A	Request formal discussion at appropriate level
B	Miscellaneous
C	Notify the capital or nations
D	Produce a background paper to head of relevant committee
E	Go public

Interestingly, when asked for elites to provide their own examples of responding to a strategic error, elites again emphasized the importance of discussing the issue internally with multiple colleagues. Figure EE and Figure FF demonstrate elites' descriptions of their own actions. These examples did not perfectly align with their earlier comments on what they would hypothetically do—as can be seen by comparing the figures below with those above. However, in both cases, the most frequent response from elites was to stress the importance of informal discussion among colleagues.

Figure EE: First Reaction to Example Provided of Strategic Error: Question 4

N=43

A	Told multiple colleagues in division or delegation
B	Reported it at a committee or council meeting
C	Told supervisor
D	Told colleague in division or delegation
E	Recorded in internal documents
F	Circulated a food-for-thought paper or email
G	No answer provided

Figure FF: Second Reaction to Example Provided of Strategic Error: Question 4

N=30

A	Reported it at a committee or council meeting
B	Miscellaneous
C	Told colleague outside of division or delegation
D	Told multiple colleagues in division or delegation
E	Called a meeting with the commander
F	Recorded in internal documents
G	Told supervisor
H	Circulated a food-for-thought paper or email
I	Recorded in public documents
J	Told Colleague in division and delegation

Figure GG: Quotes on Private Documentation

Central Registry Documentation
One thing that I didn't mention is our system for moving paper around which also is very much managed by these registry guys. . . . And then we manage the analysis of it to some sort of, you know, synopsis and recommendation to the leadership in the private office. All that is retained. **All that is searchable. All of that is, as I said, maintained by our registry team.** So they have binders of the old stuff, the hard copies. And actually, they still retain any paper that we get up here. Like those invitations and so forth. I don't know for how long. We have an archive somewhere in some basement. They might. I don't know exactly where that is. But I can find out for you. **But we are pretty well suited to, you know, finding old stuff**.[182]
Food-for-Thought Papers
If I saw we were about to make a strategic error I would **write a think piece paper, food-for-thought paper, background brief paper, decision brief paper on it, state what I thought was important and then to director Ops to director general at International Military Staff to CMC** or I could just burst out during one of the morning meetings with the same people persons and say, "This doesn't make sense." And I've done that. It's the emperor has no clothes; this doesn't make sense.[183]
Somebody would prepare some [strategic errors] to discuss at the NAC level. But at the end of the day they would have the signature of the Secretary General that he's forwarding this kind of stuff to us. **So [the papers] are from the IS** but I don't know. There is from time to time, these [papers], yes, but this is prepared by the IS. Where in the IS, I don't know. For us, it's the international secretariat so the Secretary General would introduce it.[184]
Most of the very interesting papers at IS level are—Now that was the previous Sec Gen. They were completely close hold. They produced great papers. **Some of them I saw. Not bad that thing. Can we use it? No. Because [former Secretary General] Rasmussen was like that.** He kept it for himself and then he would manipulate a committee to endorse that thing later. So it would come back under someone else's writing, and you know, "A nation has offered food for thought. And I think it's a great idea." So there's manipulation there . . . I'm sure there are papers circulated. Now, I'm not a natural target for those papers. **Some of them is leaked to nations, I suppose, hoping for their support, you know, that kind of stuff. That kind of intellectual traffic happens.** Not necessarily related to strategic issues by the way. That's not JALLC's stories.[185]
Personal Notebooks
[My predecessor and I] we spent one full solid week running through everything you're expected to run through, and **he left me great ring binders full of documents**. In fact, I'm turning around, I'm looking at one sitting behind me right now that I've kept. And so on and so forth.[186]
We have this so-called the green folder, and everything is in there, so what is happening now. So, the most, kind of, current [protocol] is always reflected and this is regularly every week, by Friday, this is updated**. So this, I call it my bible,** so everything is in there. **Even if I am lost, if I'm, very often it**

Mechanism 3: Crisis Management Exercises

Identifying Strategic Errors via the Crisis Management Exercise

Figure HH indicates that many elites (18 percent) viewed the exercise as a means of understanding working methods whereas others saw it as a means of identifying key lessons (12 percent). Similarly, quotes reflected on elites' use of the exercise for developing their institutional memory of responding to crises in the past.

Figure HH: Utility of the Crisis Management Exercise

A	No mention of it
B	Means of understanding working methods
C	Way to identify lessons
D	Formal procedure

Visual Evidence of CMX

Visual evidence of the CMX taking place can only slightly increase the likelihood that Proposition 1 is correct. The occurrence of the exercise provided no guarantee that elites used it as an excuse to share sensitive knowledge about NATO's past efforts to manage crises.

Therefore, such visual evidence is appropriate for a straw-in-the-wind test. I conducted interviews in person at NATO Headquarters at the time of the annual CMX. In being escorted from one interview to the next, I saw signs on doors explicitly demarcated as breakout rooms for the CMX. Other elites briefly showed me in their offices internal documents outlining the CMX agenda, as well as lessons collected by the IS from the previous year's (2014) CMX. These visual cues provided some evidence in support of Proposition 1, but such evidence was not nearly as important as the larger body of evidence already described above.

Evidence Against Proposition 2: State Silo Explanation

Overall, there was a lack of support in the evidence for a state silo explanation of NATO's institutional memory. First, as seen in Figure II below, the answer to survey question 22 did not indicate that *states* are the ones formally responsible for capturing NATO's strategic errors. Rather, most elites suggested that such an institution does not exist. Even responses by smaller groups of elites still did not identify states for this responsibility. Elites instead described the process of developing institutional memory at NATO as informal—as opposed to a few formal processes occurring within NATO's member states. As a result, one can conclude that such evidence fails a hoop test. Critically, failing a hoop test eliminates the hypothesis.

Figure II: Formal Institution for Identifying Strategic Errors: Question 22[188]

A	No institution formally responsible for strategic errors
B	JALLC
C	ACT
D	NAC
E	Commanders
F	IS
G	ACO
H	Every institution
I	Standardization organization
J	Centers of excellence
K	I don't know

Second, a straw-in-the wind test did indicate that some delegations to NATO *do* retain knowledge of strategic errors within their respective civilian sides of their delegations. According to interviews, at least three (United States, Canada, France) out of twenty-eight member states have formal lessons learned processes that occur within their delegations and in coordination with foreign ministries following a crisis management operation. In reflecting on Canada's involvement in the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Saideman argued that, "we cannot rely on government to share the lessons they learn."[189] However, these three countries represented only 10 percent of all of NATO's member states. Therefore, the evidence only partially confirms a straw-in-the-wind test.

Third, stronger evidence for the state silo explanation appears in a hoop test of evidence that member states' respective militaries maintain their own lessons learned processes. Evidence

exists in both references to these processes in interviews, as well as on the websites of militaries of individual member states. Yet with a hoop test, the existence of such processes increases the chances that Proposition 2 is correct but does not confirm it.

Fourth, elites characterized the processes of institutional memory development and the organizational culture as informal, as noted earlier. I interpret the informal processes as evidence that fails a hoop test and therefore eliminates my support for Proposition 2. By relying on informal processes, elites instead transcended national barriers within the organization to share knowledge of past errors. A state silo explanation would depend on elites exclusively using states' respective formal lessons learned processes and yet there is no evidence of this. I interpret the latter informal culture as evidence that fails a straw-in-the-wind test. A more informal culture makes the climate of the organization more conducive to sharing but far from guarantees it.

Fifth, there were some state elites who described sharing such knowledge with their supervisors. The reason, however, that this remains a straw-in-the-wind test is that all types of elites (national, secretariat, military, civilian) indicated that they told their supervisors about errors. This evidence does not tell us about how knowledge of strategic errors reverberated across the organization above and beyond one's conversation with a supervisor.

Sixth, a doubly decisive test definitively eliminated Proposition 2 because a state silo explanation implies a lack of sharing of knowledge of strategic errors. By definition, silos of knowledge are those that are kept isolated from one another. Evidence in interviews that individuals did share knowledge about past errors—both among delegations within NATO Headquarters and among elites of different nationalities. These pieces of evidence provide the most damaging evidence against Proposition 2. Rather, individuals from different member states regularly used interpersonal connections—rather than their nations—as a means for

communicating about past crisis management operations. For example, one former NATO

official said that, "behind the scenes," civilian and military staff from delegations do exchange

their respective states' lessons learned papers. The papers, however, are given such a high

security clearance that few other elites have a chance to read them.[190] Other elites observed, "At

the strategic level, there's less lessons identified"[191] and "Usually nations are not . . . they don't

extract that many strategic-level lessons" in the first place.[192] Elites described that, while a few

states could afford to have their own respective lessons learned capacities, it was the individuals

who mattered in choosing to selectively share the knowledge of those errors.

Finally, evidence that NATO elites share tactical intelligence, as well as scholarship on

intelligence sharing, provides some slight evidence against Proposition 2. If member states were

more willing to share intelligence, they would likely be more willing to share knowledge of

strategic errors from operations. An interview with an IMS elite indicated that states do on

occasion share intelligence but such intelligence is tactical—not strategic. Citing Russia's

incursion and ultimate annexation of Ukraine, the elite said, "From an intelligence piece, we use

tactical intelligence to build the picture of what Russia is ultimately trying to achieve here."[193]

The elite cautioned that there remained significant work left to do on cooperation: "We need to

restore a lot of and improve upon a lot of the capabilities that we used to have, and we don't have

much time to share."[194] Recent scholarship also found that international intelligence cooperation

has increased in both quality and quantity.[195] More importantly, several states have already

publicly shared their national lessons from NATO operations.[196] Such sharing of intelligence can

only slightly contrast the predictions of Proposition 2 because the hypothesis requires an absence

of sharing. However, because intelligence is substantively different from national lessons learned

reports, I cannot conclude that evidence of sharing of one implies evidence of sharing of the other.

Ultimately, I reject the state silo argument behind Proposition 2 because evidence fails two hoop tests and fails a doubly decisive test. I found evidence to indicate that, even though a few delegations do collect lessons from NATO's strategic errors, member states do not keep knowledge siloed from one another in practice.

Evidence Against Proposition 3: IO Repository Explanation

First, of those interviewed, the largest proportion of elites did not identify a single institution as responsible for strategic errors. This observation is problematic for a repository explanation. Without identifying the JALLC specifically, the evidence fails a hoop test because the JALLC— as the lessons learned center—is so central to a repository explanation. As Figure II above indicated, more than a third of elites interviewed said simply that there was no institution for capturing NATO's strategic errors, whereas 24 percent indicated that JALLC was responsible for this. Figure II also demonstrated elites' diverse responses of elites to the question—rather than responses concentrated on the JALLC.

Second, CPOs failed a (rare) doubly decisive test regarding the critical use of the JALLC in the development of NATO's institutional memory. There was substantial evidence in interviews that the JALLC was not able to capture knowledge of strategic errors, yet such evidence would be needed to support Proposition 3. A table of quotes in Chapter 5 points to the many reasons that elites cited for *not* using these two resources (JALLC and LLP.) Elites shared a belief that the center's reports do not capture strategic errors. Instead, they reflect knowledge of tactical errors.[197] One elite said, "I saw a couple of products from JALLC. Of course, there are

different abstraction levels. Mainly, those lessons learned are tactical."[198] Another elite said that because JALLC is situated under the leadership of ACT, "it does a lot of operational analysis more than lessons learned."[199] This evidence indicates a need to eliminate Proposition 3.

Third, in interviews, NATO elites indicated that the LLP did not typically capture strategic errors; instead, it captured tactical errors. Evidence for elites' beliefs that the LLP failed to acquire knowledge of strategic errors can be seen in a second table of quotes in Chapter 5. This CPO fails a hoop test because NATO's repository (the JALLC) plays the critical role in the LLP's ability to capture knowledge. In describing the formal learning processes that occurred, an IMS elite observed that at NATO, "learning is more on an operational level. There may be a strategic impact, but normally we're not taking the political lessons. It's not our role to do so at IMS."[200] Citing the ACT as an institution responsible for strategic lessons, an ACT elite admitted that "mostly [NATO lessons] are about doctrinal aspects that are identified that need to be improved" and that these are "mostly operational and tactical."[201]

Fourth, for Proposition 3 to be supported, elites should have cited the use of NATO's formal learning processes. Yet evidence provided earlier in the book indicates that most processes of memory development are informal—rather than formal. Quotes from elites confirmed that they do not share knowledge of strategic errors through formal processes. The failure to pass this hoop test indicates a need to eliminate Proposition 3.

Fifth, evidence for a smoking gun test concerning elites' use of an online repository failed. Specifically, if Proposition 3 were correct, we would need to find evidence that elites actually contribute to the NLLP. Yet out of 120 interviews with elites, no elite said that he or she had done so. Instead, the majority of elites who cited NATO's formal learning processes said that they do not use them and explained why.

Some elites argued that inputting lessons into the JALLC portal was too time-consuming. For example, one elite said, "The process is bureaucratic, time-consuming. It takes you away from the other things you're doing, so often you don't volunteer to do that."[202] Other elites described identifying strategic errors as "a slower-moving process" and said that "strategic errors are sometimes harder to define because you end up trying to make it you know, the balance of judgments."[203]

Sixth, many elites identified a disconnect between the JALLC and NATO Headquarters. This represents a straw-in-the-wind test. The disconnect decreases the likelihood that the repository explanation is correct but it does not eliminate it. One JALLC elite said:

> The lessons learned part, however, is a huge distractor. It's used as an excuse for other institutions to not learn. Before JALLC existed, the doctrine guys were locked in with the exercises. They'd put experimental things into exercises and ask, "Will this work for doctrine?" SOPs and doctrine is where you record your institutional learning. We learned how to do this better. That link has been broken by the establishment of the JALLC. We have very little to do with doctrine. We're frequently called to participate in doctrine.[204]

It is important to reiterate the limitation on this research design in that I cannot conclusively dismiss Proposition 3. Classified official NATO lessons documents or official JALLC reports may exist to support the hypothesis even though these documents are not publicly available. Without access to the NLLP or to the lessons themselves, I cannot be entirely certain that the process does or does not capture strategic errors.

However, given these limitations, I have strong reason to believe that such documents—if released—would not substantiate Proposition 3. If NATO elites *were* reporting strategic errors

through formal channels in classified official documents, one would expect them to assure me that the documents exist. They have an instrumental motivation to do so—to protect the reputation of the organization. Yet the fact that elites admitted that they did *not* use formal channels against this interest suggests that they are likely telling the truth. To the best of my knowledge, there was no reason for them to bend the truth on questions of process.

The LLP is known for being a lengthy process (see Chapter 5). For a lesson to be endorsed, the lesson must be approved by means of consensus at the level of the NAC. Inevitably, there are disagreements over what to include and what to exclude. First tasked by the strategic commands (ACO and ACT), the JALLC then works in collaboration with other NATO institutions (IS, IMS, etc.) to compile, produce, receive endorsement from the NAC, and ultimately circulate a lesson on a given crisis management operation. This formal process can take months, and in some cases years. One IMS elite described the process of establishing a formal lessons learned paper on the 2011 Libya operation:

> It's a twenty-eight nation approved lessons learned thing that needs then to trigger action in all the different areas. . . . I think it took a while and right so because it is a complex. I mean, a campaign like Libya lasted actually for seven entire months, which is not that long, but still. There is a lot to observe, a lot to learn, and that takes some time to be collated and compiled and discussed. It, of course, requires the consensus. One nation is perhaps of the opinion that it is not a lesson that needs to be followed up. Others will say, "Yes. Certainly." And we have it so, ok. At the end, we have what we call it a database or a book or whatever you call it and there is, of course, action items and suspense dates. Then we get to work on it.[205]

Ultimately, the LLP can produce a least-common-denominator result. This endorsement process leads NATO civilians to reduce the document to only palatable lessons with which all states can agree. Without endorsement, the lesson cannot continue through the formal process of incorporating the lesson and ensuring change. An elite described how many drafts of lessons never actually receive endorsement by the NAC:

> When a lesson is endorsed, most likely it will be implemented I would say. We have a problem—maybe with endorsement too. It's not only with implementation because you know, when it is endorsed, the lesson is endorsed so it means that action bodies are officially tasked. And in military organizations when somebody is officially tasked, so most likely they will complete that task. I mean 80 percent, 70 percent, 100 percent [it will] be completed somehow. But sometimes we have a problem in lessons; they are not endorsed. They just remain as lesson identified and those are pending, pending, pending, and then sometimes we are overtaken by events. Sometimes, I don't know, they get lost and we have—if you look into NATO Lessons Learned Portal, you will see a lot of lessons identified and on the order of—as I said 15–25 percent may be implemented and those implemented later on so that's a major problem.[206]

This statement suggesting that most are not endorsed contrasts with JALLC's publicly available figure, which states that the JALLC analysis report endorsement rate for 2015 is 80 percent. Without having direct access to internal servers, I cannot personally confirm which is the correct number. Nevertheless, it is critical to note the contrast between what a JALLC official has said under the condition of anonymity versus what the JALLC has publicly projected.

Scholarship on organizational behavior indicates that organizations are certainly incentivized to make statements that strengthen its reputation.[207]

The vetting process of endorsement allows the NAC to ensure that NATO is only circulating lessons that would not be politically sensitive to its member states. Who endorses the lesson (e.g., NAC, ACO, IMS) depends on the level of the project.[208] Authors of lessons are thus incentivized to self-censor to meet the interests of the endorsing institution.

Ultimately, the development of institutional memory is contingent on knowledge transfer. In other words, the circulation of an endorsed lesson does not guarantee that those receiving it will consider it. In fact, most NATO elites admitted in interviews that they do not read the JALLC reports of the official NATO lessons produced through the LLP. This suggests that the LLP is limited in its ability to contribute to the organization's institutional memory.

If Proposition 3 were correct, one would expect elites to consume these documents. Elites' use of a repository would also increase their likelihood of contributing to it. However, evidence indicated that both elites' supply and demand of these documents was low. Chapter 5 provides further discussion on the structural constraints of NATO's formal learning process. In brief, I dismiss Proposition 3 because evidence from observations discussed above failed two hoop tests and failed a doubly decisive test. There is little evidence to suggest that NATO elites share knowledge of strategic errors through the organization's repository—the JALLC—or use the LLP for this purpose.

Figure JJ: Quotes on Elites Not Reading Formal NATO Lessons

There is a very process **heavy lessons learned process**, which I find so process-heavy that I don't pay very much attention to it to be honest.[209]
There have been a **number of exercises done** on the lessons from that operation. And frankly in this, in my current job, **I haven't gone back and sifted through them**.[210]
It's a **huge institution that produces a lot of documents**, a lot of reports, but when you have too many documents or reports to deal with, you are unable to read all of them. Of course there are some information that you are unable to use, perhaps a second tool is a how to use and read the press, some press assessment. . . . The person who is going to take the right strategic decision is not the guy who have read all of the different documents from the Joint Lessons Learned Center. So yeah, it's more complicated than that. . . . People, the politicians sometimes do not have the time to do it . . . so they rely on their personal experience and perhaps also on the press assessment.[211]
NATO is you have to say, from one hand, it's a huge organization. There are a lot of documents coming and only for a few guys who really need to look, read, understand everything, and to task. And **sometimes of course they cannot read hundreds of pages everyday**. **That's why we have staffs. But sometimes, lessons identified—maybe they are not the top priority or something or the reader doesn't understand the problem**. Another problem is because we don't sometimes have the experts standing directly or talking with the commander responsible that say, "Look this is important because this and that." So it's another problem—by and by. It is advised to have lessons learned staff officers. It is advised to have experts or advisors to commanders who should say this to them. But I don't know.[212]
The lessons, we did a whole series of lessons identified from Unify Protector. But I can bet your bottom dollar that we didn't look at any of those. The problem is we don't learn. **We record them, but we don't learn them.** And that's the greatest problem we've got. We don't go back. I don't routinely go back into a document and go, "Oh yeah"—into a repository—"yeah, I remember that now."[213]
Yeah, that's a question. I mean, I don't know who's reading it, but I assume not many people read it. I assume. I mean, I expected it to be, because we were tasked by the IMS, so it will, it will go up the chain. The Military Committee will whatever, do something with it. I mean, the IMS will prepare a paper for the Military Committee. And then it will probably go to the OPC and . . . **I mean, I don't expect much to happen. Some things might change, but I don't expect much to happen**. I think we have so much to learn from this Afghanistan story, and **I would hope, I hope, I really hope that we learn. So we'll see.[214]**
The lessons learned are classified. People who come in here are told the lessons learned documents exist, by virtue of a Public Diplomacy Division. People don't keep a lot of classified documents. They're told they exist. There's references to earlier lessons learned. **But to be frank, it's not first**

and foremost in our mind, to keep those documents on the top of the shelf because as staff turn over, they'll be told what the lessons learned are, and there'd be little interest on the part of new staff to actually read through all of this stuff, is my sense.[215]

That's one of the **problems with the lessons learned databases**, that many of the lessons learned, are [all identified], or classified in nature, and they **you just cannot move them easily from one place to another**. No, well, either, because they have a security classification. They are confidential or secret, or whatever. And then you need to have that access to that information. And then secondly, it's because there are **[some of them], that are need to know information that is for a particular community only**. And there is information, that there are that it is not good that it gets diffused to outside that particular domain. Even if you have access to secret information, there is no point in getting access to that, because it's not your particular field. **And to protect information, it's always best to keep it within the domain in which it was generated. It needs to be worked out. Need to know, basis**.[216]

Figure KK: Quotes on Reflections on Errors During CMX

NATO does not, at the moment, have any declared adversaries so we use a scenario course called [. . .] or in this particular case, or the Eurasia scenario for out of area operations. And we do that deliberately because of the political sensitivity. If we were to start to use a scenario whereby Holland was the aggressor vis-à-vis Belgium, we could be sure to ruffle feathers in the NAC. And so that's why, at this moment in time, we're not in a situation to do that. However, **with the current changing European security climate**, it would not surprise me if that were to change in the future. Well if there's, I mean, we don't exercise those, **but we do exercise things which look an awful lot like that. And when we go into real world crisis identification and estimation and options, we look at the real world**. **There's a lot more interest in the crisis management this year, compared to say twelve or twenty-four months ago. There's a huge difference. It used to be sort of, "Well, you know, this is if NATO goes to war. Well, you know, when is that going to happen?"** Whereas now, we can see a spike in the attention level as well as in the engagement, and the discussions are extremely interesting. They are higher level, definitely. And—relative to the past, and also very much, you know, that's your thing. Although you may see a junior diplomat, he has a mandate, and you know, he's very well informed.[217]

CMX is like a real operation. You know? Take an example that a crisis break out somewhere in the world, okay. **And they test the procedures that NATO uses as we do in an actual operation.** So, and the delegations participate at the military level, and the political level. Okay? So in a working groups, I send for example, two guys, from my delegation to be part of that. And not only here, but we have the working group also in, back in our country. Okay? It works like that. You have the crisis and the leading, **let's** say group, of this exercise, they inject events. They say, okay, one submarine, let's say, went underwater explosion, so we send this back to the working group that we have in our country and tell them. We here, also started this situation. What NATO should do on these occasions? Okay? What are the options that we, as a military proposes to the NAC? So there are military part of that exercise and there is also political part. Because we can suggest a course of action that is not really good for politicians to follow. So it's like in normal decision-making cycle. So this is **the purpose of this exercise is how to improve the decision-making cycle within the NATO if we have a real crisis. That's why we involve the capitals.** Because in real crisis, you mentioned Libya for example, the same thing it was. So NATO was working here. I was back in my country, [but I] working there. You know, do you approve this action that NATO will take, or not? So **participation in a crisis, in CMX exercises was from military and political. Because the decisions are of military nature, and political nature. That's all.**

Because you know, you have, when NAC will convene, this is for ambassadors and for deputies, you know When military committee, we will convene, military representatives will be there. Because this is a format of meeting in NATO. When they discuss in the working groups, I don't go there, because my experts go there. And when they discuss in the civilian working groups, ambassadors do not attend, you know. So ambassadors attend the NAC, but if two or three ambassadors are not participating there, because they are leave, or they have some health issues, you know, they send the deputies. It's not. But everybody was supposed to be aware for this exercise. Not only here, but even in capitals. No It's not the case because the Secretary General, himself was attending, so, I mean. This is very serious. And I think for the situation that we're going on, It's important. You know? The crisis you know. In the southern flank. **In the eastern flank, so. It is a mess, if you look today. It is, for me it is very, very useful. Because we cannot afford to fail. You have to exercise several times in order to be successful in a real operation. Motivation is you know, we are twenty-eight countries. We have to act fast. Okay? So we have to exercise it.** How you do? How do you make the decision-making cycle shorter? So the countries must have in place procedures, you know. And we have this even in real life, you know. Some countries need more time for answering, you know, and giving their opinion**. So we need to act fast. I think this is the main lesson learned.**[218]

However . . . CMX is limited to whether or not the Sec-Gen is pushing it. There's a framework. There's a NATO, as in the NATO lessons learned handbook. There's a process there. They can use as much or as little of it. They are encouraged to use it. We train their specialists who are their lessons learned staff officers to use the process, **but it's all down to, probably goes back to what I said about the Sec Gen and CMX. It's down to leadership.**[219]

Chapter 6: Speak No Evil: Sources That Spur Sharing Knowledge of Errors

I. Methodology

Study Design Assumptions

In the design of this experiment, I assume non-interference. The treatment of one subject should not have been affected by the treatment of other subjects for several reasons. First, interviews with subjects took place in the respective offices of each subject rather than in a public area. Second, subjects were asked at the end of interviews and in follow-up emails to not discuss the study with others until the completion of data collection. Third, it is unlikely that subjects discussed the experiment with one another since interview questions were benign and, as elites in a leading military organization, they likely had much more pressing issues to discuss. Fourth, treatment effects were embedded in the hypothetical scenarios so it was not obvious to the subject that other subjects received different scenarios. Fifth, I collected all treated and untreated scenarios so that no paperwork was left behind in subjects' offices. There were no issues with respect to noncompliance. All elites received the appropriate treatment or control. There was attrition on the part of one individual. That individual never received a treatment or control because the individual declined to participate in the experiment upon meeting for the interview.

Block Randomization

Block randomization involved thirty surveys for each treatment and thirty surveys with the placebo condition. I divided all 120 envelopes into six blocks such that each block had an equal number of treatment and control conditions. Within each block, I randomized the order of the

envelopes based on an order produced by a randomizing command in Excel software. Randomly

assigning treatments and the control in this way limited bias toward any one treatment. For each

institution visited, I brought with me to the interview a stack of the randomized-ordered

envelopes. This ensured that I was blind to treatment status.

Table V: Survey Pre-test Questions

Are you considered civilian staff or military staff?
Are you employed by NATO, a nation, or do you work as a VNC?[220]
How many years have you worked in this position in NATO?
How many years have you worked in your lifetime in NATO?
Have you had field experience of at least three months in a NATO crisis management operation?
Prior to this, have you responded to a hypothetical scenario as part of a study before?
What is your nationality?
What is your gender?
What is your age?

Note: Each elite verbally answered the following pre-test questions before receiving treatment.

Survey Instrument as Treatment

Following pre-test questions, an elite received a survey with one of the following four paragraph-long hypothetical scenarios as treatment.

Treatment: International Staff

You have just identified a decision or action that the International Staff considers to be a strategic error in an existing NATO operation. You know that the decision or action was an error because the actions led to an outcome that contradicted the strategic goals of the operation's mission. For example, the outcome may have involved significant civilian casualties, negatively affected political relations with certain states, excluded key actors from the operation or consisted of other negative consequences contradicting the mission.

Treatment: United States

You have just identified a decision or action that the United States government considers to be a strategic error in an existing NATO operation. You know that the decision or action was an error because the actions led to an outcome that contradicted the strategic goals of the operation's mission. For example, the outcome may have involved significant civilian casualties, negatively affected political relations with certain states, excluded key actors from the operation or consisted of other negative consequences contradicting the mission.

Treatment: International Media

You have just identified a decision or action that the international media have considered to be a strategic error in an existing NATO operation. You know that the decision or action was an error because the actions led to an outcome that contradicted the strategic goals of the operation's mission. For example, the outcome may have involved significant civilian casualties, negatively affected political relations with certain states, excluded key actors from the operation or consisted of other negative consequences contradicting the mission.

Control: Placebo

You have just identified a decision or action that is considered to be a strategic error in an existing NATO operation. You know that the decision or action was an error because the actions led to an outcome that contradicted the strategic goals of the operation's mission. For example, the outcome may have involved significant civilian casualties, negatively affected political relations with certain states, excluded key actors from the operation or consisted of other negative consequences contradicting the mission.

Outcome Questions

How likely would you be to record this for yourself or successors?

    1 = Not at all likely

    2 = Unlikely

    3 = Somewhat likely

    4 = Very likely

    5 = Definitely likely

How likely would you be to discuss this with your supervisor?

    1 = Not at all likely

    2 = Unlikely

    3 = Somewhat likely

    4 = Very likely

    5 = Definitely likely

How likely would you be to discuss this with a close colleague?

    1 = Not at all likely

    2 = Unlikely

    3 = Somewhat likely

    4 = Very likely

    5 = Definitely likely

IV. Results

1. Overview of Treatment Effects

Likelihood of Discussing with Supervisor

Successor: Differences in Means Across Treatments Versus Control

```
mean sccsr, over(treated)

Mean estimation                     Number of obs   =          120

              0: treated = 0
              1: treated = 1
              2: treated = 2
              3: treated = 3
```

Over	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
sccsr				
0	.8333333	.0437688	.7466667	.92
1	.85	.0458007	.7593101	.9406899
2	.8083333	.0474695	.714339	.9023277
3	.725	.0579214	.6103099	.8396901

```
. oneway sccsr treated, tabulate
```

Treatment	Summary of Q1 Successors (0-1 scale)		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
0	.83333333	.23973165	30
1	.85	.25086059	30
2	.80833333	.26000111	30
3	.725	.31724841	30
Total	.80416667	.26957665	120

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	.277083333	3	.092361111	1.28	0.2846
Within groups	8.37083333	116	.072162356		
Total	8.64791667	119	.072671569		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(3) =   2.7765 Prob>chi2 = 0.427

Supervisor: Differences in Means Across Treatments Versus Control

```
mean sprvisr, over(treated)

Mean estimation                      Number of obs   =        120

            0: treated = 0
            1: treated = 1
            2: treated = 2
            3: treated = 3
```

Over	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
sprvisr				
0	.925	.0212741	.8828752	.9671248
1	.9166667	.0249521	.8672591	.9660742
2	.925	.0212741	.8828752	.9671248
3	.9083333	.0327901	.8434056	.973261

```
. oneway sprvisr treated, tabulate
```

	Summary of Q2 Supervisor (0-1 scale)		
Treatment	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
0	.925	.1165229	30
1	.91666667	.13666807	30
2	.925	.1165229	30
3	.90833333	.17959885	30
Total	.91875	.13812406	120

	Analysis of Variance				
Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	.005729167	3	.001909722	0.10	0.9611
Within groups	2.26458333	116	.01952227		
Total	2.2703125	119	.019078256		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(3) =   7.6714 Prob>chi2 = 0.053

Colleague: Differences in Means Across Treatments Versus Control

```
mean colleague, over(treated)
Mean estimation                       Number of obs   =        120

              0: treated = 0
              1: treated = 1
              2: treated = 2
              3: treated = 3
```

Over	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
colleague				
0	.8833333	.0260783	.8316957	.9349709
1	.85	.0390255	.7727256	.9272744
2	.9	.0283654	.8438336	.9561664
3	.7583333	.055558	.648323	.8683436

```
. oneway colleague treated, tabulate
```

	Summary of Q3 Colleagues (0-1 scale)		
Treatment	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
0	.88333333	.14283662	30
1	.85	.21375139	30
2	.9	.15536387	30
3	.75833333	.30430343	30
Total	.84791667	.21812762	120

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	.359895833	3	.119965278	2.62	0.0538
Within groups	5.30208333	116	.045707615		
Total	5.66197917	119	.047579657		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(3) = 21.1406 Prob>chi2 = 0.000

Joint Statistical Test—Seemingly Unrelated Regression

```
. sureg (sccsr uscontrol)(colleague uscontrol)(sprvisr uscontrol)

Seemingly unrelated regression
```

Equation	Obs	Parms	RMSE	"R-sq"	chi2	P
sccsr	60	1	.2764482	0.0370	2.30	0.1291
colleague	60	1	.2337051	0.0667	4.29	0.0383
sprvisr	60	1	.1488381	0.0031	0.19	0.6645

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
sccsr						
uscontrol	-.1083333	.0713786	-1.52	0.129	-.2482329	.0315662
_cons	.8333333	.0504723	16.51	0.000	.7344094	.9322572
colleague						
uscontrol	-.125	.0603424	-2.07	0.038	-.2432689	-.0067311
_cons	.8833333	.0426685	20.70	0.000	.7997046	.9669621
sprvisr						
uscontrol	-.0166667	.0384298	-0.43	0.665	-.0919877	.0586544
_cons	.925	.027174	34.04	0.000	.87174	.97826

Cell Sizes Across Source Cue Conditions on Recording for Self or Successors

Source Cue	N	Not at All Likely	Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Definitely Likely
Placebo	**30**	0	3	1	9	17
Proportion		*0%*	*10%*	*3%*	*30%*	*57%*
IS	**30**	1	1	2	7	19
Proportion		*3%*	*3%*	*7%*	*23%*	*63%*
Media	**30**	1	1	4	8	16
Proportion		*3%*	*3%*	*14%*	*27%*	*53%*
US	**30**	2	2	7	5	14
Proportion		*7%*	*7%*	*23%*	*17%*	*47%*
Total	**120**	**4**	**7**	**14**	**29**	**66**
Proportion	*100%*	*3%*	*6%*	*12%*	*24%*	*55%*

Cell Sizes Across Source Cue Conditions on Discussing with Supervisor

Source Cue	N	Not at All Likely	Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Definitely Likely
Placebo	**30**	0	0	0	9	21
Proportion		*0%*	*0%*	*0%*	*30%*	*70%*
IS	**30**	0	0	1	8	21
Proportion		*0%*	*0%*	*3%*	*27%*	*70%*
Media	**30**	0	0	0	9	21
Proportion		*0%*	*0%*	*0%*	*30%*	*70%*
US	**30**	0	1	1	6	22
Proportion		*0%*	*3%*	*3%*	*20%*	*73%*
Total	**120**	0	1	2	32	85
Proportion	*100%*	*0%*	*1%*	*2%*	*27%*	*71%*

Cell Sizes Across Source Cue Conditions on Discussing with Colleague

Source Cue	N	Not at All Likely	Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Definitely Likely
Placebo	**30**	0	0	1	12	17
Proportion		*0%*	*0%*	*3%*	*40%*	*57%*
IS	**30**	0	1	4	7	18
Proportion		*0%*	*3%*	*13%*	*23%*	*60%*
Media	**30**	0	0	2	8	20
Proportion		*0%*	*0%*	*7%*	*27%*	*69%*
US	**30**	2	1	6	6	15
Proportion		*7%*	*3%*	*20%*	*20%*	*50%*
Total	**120**	2	2	13	33	70
Proportion	***100%***	***2%***	***2%***	***11%***	***28%***	***58%***

Table W: Balancing Statistics

Covariates	Mean per Treatment Group		
	IS	US	Control
Institutional affiliation	4.0	4.1	3.8
Age	54.2	52.9	52.2
Gender	.0	.1	.1
Nationality	16.5	18.7	15.7
Hypothetical scenario	.2	.1	.1
Employed by NATO or nation	.5	.5	.6
Civilian or military post	.5	.5	.5
Field experience in NATO	.4	.3	.5
Years in current NATO post	2.5	2.8	3.4
Total years working at NATO	7.9	7.5	6.7

Effect of Age on Likelihood of Recording for Self or Successors

```
. reg sccsr age
```

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	.250484588	1	.250484588			
Residual	8.39743208	118	.071164679			
Total	8.64791667	119	.072671569			

Number of obs	=	120
F(1, 118)	=	3.52
Prob > F	=	0.0631
R-squared	=	0.0290
Adj R-squared	=	0.0207
Root MSE	=	.26677

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age	.0069563	.0037078	1.88	0.063	-.0003862	.0142988
_cons	.4362946	.1975888	2.21	0.029	.045015	.8275742

2. International Staff Source Cue

Figure LL: Effect of International Staff Cue on Recording for Self or Successors

	Model 3		Model 4	
International Staff cue	0.23	(0.51)	2.51	(2.15)
Institution	--	--	-.36	(0.44)
International Staff cue × Institution	--	--	-0.69	(0.48)
Age	--	--	0.15**	(0.07)
Gender	--	--	-2.04	(1.39)
Nationality	--	--	0.03	(0.05)
Hypothetical scenario experience	--	--	2.35*	(1.22)
Employer	--	--	-1.92	(1.41)
Civilian or military post	--	--	-2.29**	(1.15)
Field experience in NATO operations	--	--	0.79	(0.95)
Years in current NATO post	--	--	0.10	(0.22)
Total years working at NATO	--	--	-0.03	(0.09)
N	60		51	
Pseudo R²	0.001		0.243	

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

```
. regress sccsr iscontrol

     Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        60
------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 58)        =      0.07
      Model |  .004166667         1  .004166667   Prob > F        =    0.7934
   Residual |  3.49166667        58  .060201149   R-squared       =    0.0012
------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0160
      Total |  3.49583333        59  .059251412   Root MSE        =    .24536


      sccsr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   iscontrol |   .0166667   .0633515     0.26   0.793    -.1101451    .1434784
      _cons |   .8333333   .0447963    18.60   0.000     .7436639    .9230028
```

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```
. ologit sccsr iscontrol

Iteration 0:    log likelihood = -63.451558
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -63.349402
Iteration 2:    log likelihood = -63.349366
Iteration 3:    log likelihood = -63.349366

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs    =         60
                                               LR chi2(1)       =       0.20
                                               Prob > chi2      =     0.6512
Log likelihood = -63.349366                    Pseudo R2        =     0.0016
```

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	.2315656	.5128043	0.45	0.652	-.7735124	1.236644
/cut1	-3.970394	1.034454			-5.997887	-1.942902
/cut2	-2.289235	.5226124			-3.313536	-1.264933
/cut3	-1.762226	.4475332			-2.639375	-.8850767
/cut4	-.2926465	.3606153			-.9994396	.4141466

```
. ologit sccsr iscontrol institution isinstit age gender nationality hypsc workfor civmil fe totaly
> rs currentyrs

Iteration 0:    log likelihood = -54.608911
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -43.288503
Iteration 2:    log likelihood = -41.422086
Iteration 3:    log likelihood = -41.330035
Iteration 4:    log likelihood =  -41.32973
Iteration 5:    log likelihood =  -41.32973

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs   =        51
                                                LR chi2(12)     =     26.56
                                                Prob > chi2     =    0.0089
Log likelihood = -41.32973                      Pseudo R2       =    0.2432
```

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	2.514751	2.153178	1.17	0.243	-1.705401	6.734903
institution	-.3592439	.438776	-0.82	0.413	-1.219229	.5007414
isinstit	-.6895299	.4771649	-1.45	0.148	-1.624756	.2456962
age	.1482643	.066156	2.24	0.025	.0186009	.2779277
gender	-2.036839	1.393751	-1.46	0.144	-4.768541	.6948638
nationality	.0321651	.0468199	0.69	0.492	-.0596003	.1239304
hypsc	2.352692	1.215046	1.94	0.053	-.028755	4.734139
workfor	-1.920942	1.406394	-1.37	0.172	-4.677425	.8355398
civmil	-2.294213	1.151573	-1.99	0.046	-4.551256	-.0371709
fe	.7907935	.9545058	0.83	0.407	-1.080004	2.66159
totalyrs	-.0316067	.0915425	-0.35	0.730	-.2110266	.1478133
currentyrs	.0990097	.2170888	0.46	0.648	-.3264766	.524496
/cut1	.1861184	4.531683			-8.695816	9.068053
/cut2	2.134016	4.45236			-6.59245	10.86048
/cut3	2.615301	4.449798			-6.106142	11.33675
/cut4	4.847828	4.495357			-3.962911	13.65857

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Effect of International Staff Source Cue on Discussing with Colleague

```
. ologit colleague iscontrol

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -57.231961
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -57.211061
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -57.21106

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs   =          60
                                               LR chi2(1)      =        0.04
                                               Prob > chi2     =      0.8380
Log likelihood =  -57.21106                    Pseudo R2       =      0.0004
```

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	-.1044894	.5109874	-0.20	0.838	-1.106006	.8970276
/cut1	-4.130261	1.041694			-6.171943	-2.088579
/cut2	-2.246638	.4949862			-3.216793	-1.276483
/cut3	-.3852671	.355361			-1.081762	.3112277

```
ologit colleague iscontrol institution isinstit age gender nationality hypsc workfor civmil fe
currentyrs totalyrs


Iteration 0:    log likelihood = -50.462919
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -45.801131
Iteration 2:    log likelihood = -45.600649
Iteration 3:    log likelihood = -45.599522
Iteration 4:    log likelihood = -45.599522


Ordered logistic regression              Number of obs    =       51
                                         LR chi2(12)      =     9.73
                                         Prob > chi2      =   0.6399
Log likelihood = -45.599522              Pseudo R2        =   0.0964
```

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	2.612736	1.95159	1.34	0.181	-1.21231	6.437782
institution	-.2510064	.4084943	-0.61	0.539	-1.05164	.5496277
isinstit	-.6857168	.4295867	-1.60	0.110	-1.527691	.1562577
age	.0088958	.052945	0.17	0.867	-.0948745	.1126661
gender	-.3105673	1.299044	-0.24	0.811	-2.856647	2.235512
nationality	.0215658	.0416475	0.52	0.605	-.0600618	.1031934
hypsc	.8699761	.8581995	1.01	0.311	-.812064	2.552016
workfor	-1.586466	1.300017	-1.22	0.222	-4.134452	.9615201
civmil	-.8869824	.9657994	-0.92	0.358	-2.779914	1.00595
fe	.4816929	.8679992	0.55	0.579	-1.219554	2.18294
currentyrs	-.0675752	.1626954	-0.42	0.678	-.3864524	.251302
totalyrs	.0142083	.0731744	0.19	0.846	-.1292108	.1576275
/cut1	-5.532997	4.124168			-13.61622	2.550223
/cut2	-3.591118	4.043174			-11.51559	4.333358
/cut3	-1.614883	4.022449			-9.498738	6.268972

```
. regress colleague iscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	.016666667	1	.016666667
Residual	1.91666667	58	.033045977
Total	1.93333333	59	.032768362

Number of obs	= 60
F(1, 58)	= 0.50
Prob > F	= 0.4804
R-squared	= 0.0086
Adj R-squared	= -0.0085
Root MSE	= .18179

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	-.0333333	.0469368	-0.71	0.480	-.1272876	.0606209
_cons	.8833333	.0331893	26.61	0.000	.8168976	.949769

Effect of International Staff Source Cue on Discussing with Supervisor

```
. regress sprvisr iscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	.001041667	1	.001041667
Residual	.935416667	58	.016127874
Total	.936458333	59	.015872175

Number of obs	= 60
F(1, 58)	= 0.06
Prob > F	= 0.8003
R-squared	= 0.0011
Adj R-squared	= -0.0161
Root MSE	= .127

sprvisr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
iscontrol	-.0083333	.0327901	-0.25	0.800	-.0739699	.0573032
_cons	.925	.0231861	39.89	0.000	.878588	.971412

3. US Source Cue

Effect of US Source Cue on Recording for Self or Successors

```
. regress sccsr uscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS			
				Number of obs	=	60
				F(1, 58)	=	2.23
Model	.176041667	1	.176041667	Prob > F	=	0.1411
Residual	4.58541667	58	.079058908	R-squared	=	0.0370
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0204
Total	4.76145833	59	.080702684	Root MSE	=	.28117

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
uscontrol	-.1083333	.0725989	-1.49	0.141	-.2536557	.0369891
_cons	.8333333	.0513351	16.23	0.000	.7305749	.9360918

	Model 9		Model 10	
US cue	-.11	(0.07)	-.13	(.08)
Institution	--	--	-.05	(.04)
Age	--	--	.01	(.01)
Gender	--	--	-.01	(.20)
Nationality	--	--	.00	(.00)
Hypothetical scenario experience	--	--	.05	(.12)
Employer	--	--	-.36**	(.14)
Civilian or military Post	--	--	-.03	(.10)
Field experience in NATO operations	--	--	.01	(.10)
Years in current NATO post	--	--	-.01	(.02)
Total years working at NATO	--	--	.01	(.01)
N	60		53	
Pseudo R²	0.01		0.07	

Notes: OLS regression models. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

Figure MM: Effect of US Source Cue on Discussing with Colleague

	Model 5		Model 6	
US cue	-.68	(0.50)	-0.98	(0.64)
Institution	--	--	-.38	(0.34)
Age	--	--	0.04	(.05)
Gender	--	--	-.80	(1.32)
Nationality	--	--	0.01	(0.04)
Hypothetical scenario experience	--	--	1.04	(0.96)
Employer	--	--	-0.87	(1.05)
Civilian or military Post	--	--	-2.13***	(0.82)
Field experience in NATO operations	--	--	0.40	(0.77)
Years in current NATO post	--	--	-0.03	(0.13)
Total years working at NATO	--	--	0.01	(0.04)
N	60		53	
Pseudo R²	0.01		0.10	

Notes: Ordered logistic analysis models. Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

```
. regress colleague uscontrol

      Source |       SS           df       MS        Number of obs   =        60
-------------+----------------------------------     F(1, 58)        =      4.15
       Model |    .234375          1    .234375       Prob > F        =    0.0463
    Residual |  3.27708333        58  .056501437      R-squared       =    0.0667
-------------+----------------------------------     Adj R-squared   =    0.0507
       Total |  3.51145833        59  .059516243      Root MSE        =     .2377

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   colleague |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    uscontrol |      -.125    .061374     -2.04   0.046    -.2478533   -.0021467
       _cons |    .8833333   .0433979     20.35   0.000     .7964629    .9702037
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Effect of US Source Cue on Discussing with Supervisor

```
. regress sprvisr uscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	.004166667	1	.004166667	Number of obs	=	60
Residual	1.32916667	58	.022916667	F(1, 58)	=	0.18
				Prob > F	=	0.6714
				R-squared	=	0.0031
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0141
Total	1.33333333	59	.02259887	Root MSE	=	.15138

sprvisr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
uscontrol	-.0166667	.0390868	-0.43	0.671	-.0949074	.0615741
_cons	.925	.0276385	33.47	0.000	.8696755	.9803245

Effect of US Source Cue on Americans Versus Non-Americans

```
. reg sccsr uscontrol american american_uscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	.631458333	3	.210486111	Number of obs	=	60
Residual	4.13	56	.07375	F(3, 56)	=	2.85
				Prob > F	=	0.0452
				R-squared	=	0.1326
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0862
Total	4.76145833	59	.080702684	Root MSE	=	.27157

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
uscontrol	-.05	.0768115	-0.65	0.518	-.2038718	.1038718
american	.02	.1330413	0.15	0.881	-.2465138	.2865138
american_uscontrol	-.35	.1881489	-1.86	0.068	-.7269075	.0269075
_cons	.83	.0543139	15.28	0.000	.7211962	.9388038

```
. reg colleague uscontrol american american_uscontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	.326458333	3	.108819444
Residual	3.185	56	.056875
Total	3.51145833	59	.059516243

Number of obs	= 60
$F(3, 56)$	= 1.91
Prob > F	= 0.1379
R-squared	= 0.0930
Adj R-squared	= 0.0444
Root MSE	= .23848

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
uscontrol	-.11	.0674537	-1.63	0.109	-.245126	.025126
american	.14	.1168332	1.20	0.236	-.0940451	.3740451
american_uscontrol	-.09	.1652271	-0.54	0.588	-.4209897	.2409897
_cons	.86	.047697	18.03	0.000	.7644515	.9555485

4. International Media Source Cue

Effect of International Media Source Cue on Recording for Self or Successors

```
. ologit sccsr mediacontrol

Iteration 0:    log likelihood =  -68.51893
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -68.449416
Iteration 2:    log likelihood = -68.449404
Iteration 3:    log likelihood = -68.449404

Ordered logistic regression              Number of obs    =          60
                                         LR chi2(1)       =        0.14
                                         Prob > chi2      =      0.7092
Log likelihood = -68.449404              Pseudo R2        =      0.0010
```

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	-.185459	.4975904	-0.37	0.709	-1.160718	.7898003
/cut1	-4.172992	1.041794			-6.21487	-2.131114
/cut2	-2.494592	.5367398			-3.546582	-1.442601
/cut3	-1.705427	.4343402			-2.556718	-.8541356
/cut4	-.2925375	.3596583			-.9974548	.4123799

```
. ologit sccsr mediacontrol institution age gender nationality hypsc workfor civmil fe currenty
> rs totalyrs

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -58.927783
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -50.126467
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -49.559329
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -49.557936
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -49.557936

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs   =         53
                                               LR chi2(11)     =      18.74
                                               Prob > chi2     =     0.0659
Log likelihood = -49.557936                    Pseudo R2       =     0.1590
```

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	.4374053	.6992832	0.63	0.532	-.9331646	1.807975
institution	-.2781153	.2712698	-1.03	0.305	-.8097944	.2535638
age	.1299065	.0557943	2.33	0.020	.0205517	.2392612
gender	-.781662	1.103669	-0.71	0.479	-2.944814	1.38149
nationality	-.0386105	.0425141	-0.91	0.364	-.1219366	.0447156
hypsc	.3210837	1.17859	0.27	0.785	-1.98891	2.631077
workfor	-2.385837	1.008771	-2.37	0.018	-4.362992	-.4086816
civmil	-.7461352	.8997519	-0.83	0.407	-2.509617	1.017346
fe	.5727328	.7831979	0.73	0.465	-.9623069	2.107772
currentyrs	.1233082	.1473781	0.84	0.403	-.1655475	.412164
totalyrs	-.0284728	.0767173	-0.37	0.711	-.1788359	.1218904
/cut1	-.8430187	3.539598			-7.780504	6.094467
/cut2	1.027582	3.416547			-5.668726	7.723891
/cut3	1.696309	3.400848			-4.96923	8.361848
/cut4	3.648041	3.431425			-3.077428	10.37351

```
. regress sccsr mediacontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	60
					F(1, 58)	=	0.15
Model	.009375	1	.009375		Prob > F	=	0.7000
Residual	3.62708333	58	.06253592		R-squared	=	0.0026
					Adj R-squared	=	-0.0146
Total	3.63645833	59	.061634887		Root MSE	=	.25007

sccsr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	-.025	.0645683	-0.39	0.700	-.1542474	.1042474
_cons	.8333333	.0456567	18.25	0.000	.7419416	.9247251

Effect of International Media Source Cue on Discussing with a Colleague

```
. ologit colleague mediacontrol

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -48.846229
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -48.636837
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -48.636698
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -48.636698
```

Ordered logistic regression

Number of obs	=	60
LR chi2(1)	=	0.42
Prob > chi2	=	0.5174

Log likelihood = -48.636698

Pseudo R2	=	0.0043

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	.3404181	.5272418	0.65	0.519	-.6929569	1.373793
/cut1	-2.791599	.6342487			-4.034704	-1.548495
/cut2	-.3130331	.3622496			-1.023029	.3969631

```
. ologit colleague mediacontrol institution age gender nationality hypsc workfor civmil fe curr
> entyrs totalyrs

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -44.731691
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -40.844188
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -40.782161
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -40.782008
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -40.782008

Ordered logistic regression                      Number of obs    =         53
                                                 LR chi2(11)      =       7.90
                                                 Prob > chi2      =     0.7223
Log likelihood = -40.782008                      Pseudo R2        =     0.0883
```

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	.5846095	.659231	0.89	0.375	-.7074595	1.876679
institution	.1772126	.2914835	0.61	0.543	-.3940845	.7485096
age	.007274	.0541455	0.13	0.893	-.0988493	.1133972
gender	.6607863	1.359751	0.49	0.627	-2.004277	3.32585
nationality	.0241248	.0411697	0.59	0.558	-.0565664	.104816
hypsc	.31413	1.205017	0.26	0.794	-2.04766	2.67592
workfor	-.2025926	.9595134	-0.21	0.833	-2.083204	1.678019
civmil	.5615401	.9386304	0.60	0.550	-1.278142	2.401222
fe	-.0474035	.8156274	-0.06	0.954	-1.646004	1.551197
currentyrs	.1104624	.1446284	0.76	0.445	-.173004	.3939287
totalyrs	-.1049008	.076227	-1.38	0.169	-.2543031	.0445015
/cut1	-1.532692	3.549813			-8.490197	5.424814
/cut2	1.183179	3.528473			-5.732501	8.09886

```
. regress colleague mediacontrol
```

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	60
					F(1, 58)	=	0.19
Model	.004166667	1	.004166667		Prob > F	=	0.6669
Residual	1.29166667	58	.022270115		R-squared	=	0.0032
					Adj R-squared	=	-0.0140
Total	1.29583333	59	.021963277		Root MSE	=	.14923

colleague	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mediacontrol	.0166667	.0385315	0.43	0.667	-.0604625	.0937958
_cons	.8833333	.0272459	32.42	0.000	.8287948	.9378719

Effect of International Media Source Cue on Discussing with Supervisor

```
. regress sprvisr mediacontrol
```

```
      Source |       SS           df       MS        Number of obs   =        60
-------------+----------------------------------      F(1, 58)        =      0.00
       Model |         0            1          0      Prob > F        =    1.0000
    Residual |     .7875           58  .013577586      R-squared       =    0.0000
-------------+----------------------------------      Adj R-squared   =   -0.0172
       Total |     .7875           59  .013347458      Root MSE        =    .11652
```

```
     sprvisr |     Coef.    Std. Err.       t     P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
mediacontrol |         0     .0300861      0.00    1.000     -.0602238    .0602238
       _cons |      .925     .0212741     43.48    0.000      .8824153    .9675847
```

Table X: Check for Correlations

	US	IS	Media
Institution	0.11	0.05	0.02
Age	0.05	0.17	0.01
Gender	0	-0.08	0.06
Nationality	0.16	0.04	0.17
Hypothetical scenario	0.05	0.18	0
Employer	-0.07	-0.07	0
Civilian/military	0	0	-0.03
Field experience	-0.27	-0.17	-0.1
Current years	-0.1	-0.16	-0.13
Total years	0.04	0.09	0.06

Correlations between Sources and Control Variables

Legend: US, IS, Media

6. IRB Protocol as Pre-registration

CONFIRMATION OF EXEMPT RESEARCH REGISTRATION

February 13, 2015

▇

POLITICAL SCIENCE

RE: HS# ▇ *"Learning in Crisis: A Study of Institutional Memory in NATO Crisis Management"*

The human subjects research project referenced above has been registered with the ▇ Institutional Review Board ▇ IRB) as Exempt from Federal regulations in accordance with 45 CFR 46.101. This exemption is limited to the described activities in the registered ▇ IRB Protocol Narrative and extends to the performance of such activities at the sites identified in your ▇ IRB Protocol Application. Informed consent from subjects must be obtained unless otherwise indicated below. ▇ IRB conditions for the conduct of this research are included on the attached sheet.

Information provided to prospective subjects to obtain their informed consent should, at a minimum, consists of the following information: the subject is being asked to participate in research, what his/her participation will involve, all foreseeable risks and benefits, the extent to which privacy and confidentiality will be protected, that participation in research is voluntary and the subject may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without prejudice.

Questions concerning registration of this study may be directed to the ▇ Office of Research ▇ ▇ .

Level of Review:
Exempt Review, Category 2

▇ Ph.D.
Chair, Institutional Review Board

Registration valid from 02/13/2015 to 02/12/2018
▇ Approved: January 31, 2003

Determinations as Conditions of Exemption:
Informed Consent Requirements:
1. Signed Informed Consent Not Required
   a. Study Information Sheet Required

e-APP Tracking #: 8611

APPLICATION FOR IRB REVIEW

█████████████████████

Institutional Review Board

LEAD RESEARCHER: ████████████   HS#:_____

Electronic Submission Date: 12/19/14   *For IRB Office Use Only*

TITLE OF THE STUDY: Learning in Crisis: A Study of Institutional Memory in NATO Crisis Management

A. LEVEL OF REVIEW

Select the required level of review for this protocol.

◉ **Exempt Registration - "virtually no risk":**
Select the applicable exempt category(ies):
1. ☐ 2. ☑ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5. ☐ 6. ☐

○ **Expedited Review – no more than minimal risk:**
Select the applicable expedited category(ies):
1. ☐ 2. ☐ 3. ☐ 4. ☐ 5. ☐ 6. ☐ 7. ☐

○ **Full Committee Review - greater than minimal risk**

Type of Research: ○ Biomedical   ◉ Social/Behavioral

B. DEPARTMENT OR RESEARCH UNIT FOR THIS STUDY

Please check the applicable box below.

◉ This study will be performed under the auspices of a Department (includes campus centers and school-based research units).

○ This study will be performed under the auspices of an Organized Research Unit.

List the **name** of the Department or ORU here: **Political Science**

C. DETERMINING WHETHER HIPAA REGULATIONS APPLY TO THIS STUDY

If the research involves the review of person-identifiable medical records, or the study will result in new information that is added to medical records, the research is using or creating Protected Health Information (PHI) and is subject to HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions.
This study does not involve the creation, use or disclosure of PHI.

D. STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

All individuals engaged in human subjects research must be listed here and in the protocol narrative.

M. DEPARTMENTAL OR ORGANIZED RESEARCH UNIT (ORU) APPROVAL

The Department Chair's signature is required if the study will be performed under the auspices of a Department (includes campus centers and school-based research units). If the Department Chair is a member of the research team on this application (including Faculty Sponsor), approval must be obtained from the next highest level of administrative authority [i.e., School Dean, Executive Vice Chancellor (the Vice Chancellor for Research signs on behalf of the EVC)].

The ORU Director's signature is required if the study will be performed under the auspices of an ORU. If the ORU Director is a member of the research team on this application (including Faculty Sponsor), approval must be obtained from the Vice Chancellor for Research.

Department or ORU Assurance Statement:

By signing below, I hereby confirm that I have read the IRB Application and Protocol Narrative and I certify that:

1. The research is appropriate in design (i.e., the research uses procedures consistent with sound research design, the study design can be reasonably expected to answer the proposed question, and the importance of the knowledge expected to result from the research is known).
2. The Lead Researcher (and Faculty Sponsor) is competent to perform (or supervise) the study.
3. All study team members have disclosed to the COIOC any personal financial interests in the research.
4. There are adequate resources and funds available to support performance of this research, including costs associated with subject injury.

███████████████████████████████████████   Dec. 19, 2014

Typed Name of   Signature of   Date signed
███ Department Chair/ORU Director   ███ Department Chair/ORU Director

Chapter 7: A Reactive Culture: Why Informal Development of Memory Persists

**Figure NN: NATO's Level of Adaptability**


Figure OO: Organization Consistency

**Figure PP: Who Made the Strategic Error in Example Provided: Question 4**

Table NN: Quotes on the Constraints of Consensus

It's not easy to get the new political decision because twenty-eight nations, they have different perspective, different backgrounds, and maybe they don't have consensus. That's why maybe a new political decision will not be reached soon or, and then we continue to [gather] again.[221]
How to get twenty-eight nations to sing from the same song sheet? Sometimes, it is tactics but forging consensus is the overriding principle. The alliance is only strong because of the application, because we adhere to this main working principle. If we would go for majority, I think NATO would not have survived the last sixty-five years or so. . . . This is the main characteristic of how we prepare decisions and how we take decision. How we carry out any activity following a decision and the end, of course, when it comes to strategic issues, and that is almost always the case in this building.[222]
I wouldn't be surprised if an awful lot of people haven't pointed you towards the decision-making process within NATO as something that needs to be reformed. . . . In a crisis management model organization where twenty-eight perspectives all get a vote and it's consensus-based organization so there's no majority voting. Then it should come as no surprise that building consensus around complicated, difficult, challenging, dangerous, ambiguous crises is [laughter] difficult.[223]

Table OO: Quotes on NATO's Blame Avoidance Culture

It's a cultural thing. You do not talk about your shortfalls, your weaknesses, your shortcomings. You do not talk about specifications of armaments, about performance of those armaments, in public. Lessons are known as part of that, I would say, ensemble of topics that you do not want to talk about, lessons known, because it always or often shed a negative light on a particular aspects of your way of conducting military operations. So these documents are not normally for public release. **Is it something that should change? Probably.** There could be a few things that could be disclosed but we often also enter some of the commercially sensitive types of things. We cannot talk about, you know, each piece of equipment didn't do a good job and because we know who the manufacturer is and it wouldn't be so kind for the manufacturer.[224]
I mean, **organizations like these are not particularly proud of their strategic mistakes**, and it's very often people like yourself, or the press, who play an extremely important role in identifying where we have gone wrong.[225]
There is particular way of handling the NATO narrative and we really are terrible at it and our adversaries have been able to better use media and social media in particular to convey a message. The **NATO is prone to say the truth and will always say the truth or what is believed to be the truth but doesn't put a good spin on the truth** and a context around that truth that makes the message more positive and more prone for their population and our population to adhere to it.[226]
It depends on how you define a strategic. Military strategic, potentially. But political military level, no. Okay. And I'm not even sure nations will sign up to it at the political military level. Because **it would imply that you have to sign up to accepting the fact that some of those decisions you have been making were wrong. Give me the name of a statesman who admitted he was wrong.** Just one name. Just one. That was a bit shallow and easy.[227]
In the end [the lessons] come to the NAC, of course, **this is an entirely cumbersome process**. You ask for compilation and you get a report and you go through the military committee, then it has to go through the committee here from the OPC, and then to the council and by the time the council approves it, the lessons are farther and farther distance from what actually happened. And **the nations have watered them down i**n order not to get any criticism, this are actually, I remember very vividly, the lessons learned that we did after Pakistan after the NRF was for the first and for the time being, the last time, deployed after the earthquake. It was a very short deployment, there were very important strategic lessons, but the main nations were involved in that operation made the final lessons learned paper look like it was a big success. **So basically, they were leading the NRF at the time. They would not let any negative lessons come through.**[228]
This is a rather specific international organization where the ownership is very much felt by all of the members of the NAC. And the NAC also has a special sort of self regard . . . I'm saying this because, **in that sense, NATO is infallible. We never admit to making any mistakes.** So when you're saying would I admit to NATO having committed a strategic error, of course I would not. On the other hand, you know, there are some

doubts that one could have about some results that have followed from some of the actions in the sense of causing more instability than it was actually even thought possible.[229]

There's not that much discussion on the strategy that we have applied in Libya or in Afghanistan, you know. **It's like we are afraid to talk about that.**[230]

One of the problems with the official lessons learned, and this happened with one of the ones I was involved in, was the institution's institutional equities guard them, and treat them as a combination of promoting themselves or defending themselves. So I felt that a **part of our lessons learned was compromised because some of those involved were damn sure that they did not want to admit they'd been anything less than wonderful.** And that's institutions. I wouldn't particularly blame NATO for that**.** They were all of them.[231]

It's an interesting question because, **of course, nobody would admit that a year ago he committed a strategic error [laughter].** I think **it's there, but not spoken about**, as you said. Exactly. So I think having the lesson identified or lesson learned on a specific thing—well, that's important, of course, but if it's a strategic error, therefore, you really have to read between the lines and combine, probably, different lessons learned reports and so on. For instance. Well, of course, you have also their internal processes where documents are produced, but **you will not find, probably, a document specifically stating we made an error specifically there.**[232]

If I compare to my Ministry of Defense or any other government department, I can absolutely say with certainty that I've documents going back to 1949 which I can get my hand on and I've got people that can say, "Look. What happened on this, you know. Can you give me—run me a search on that?" And it's amazing what they come up with. So the tools are there. But, to me, **there's a sense of—people have—make themselves more important than they actually are or they are greater than they think they are.**[233]

We need to be able to keep NATO personnel accountability. **No one ever gets fired or a bad review. This is probably typical in most international organizations. Because you get seconded, you have two bosses and you can play them off against each other.** It shouldn't be that hard to get this JALLC commander to call the military representative of a particular national officer and tell them to fire him or her.[234]

It would be very difficult for an organization like NATO to confess that NATO made a strategic error by leading this operation . . . It's **very difficult for twenty-eight members—a major political audience**.[235]

There's a reliance on traditional military structures. I'm not sure those credentials are validated. **The incentives to change and to learn are not strong enough.** Rotation of military officials is not a bad thing if there's no change in doctrine.[236]

They are not implemented **because, even if we are military, we live and swim in a political environment. And to then the nations will in order to save political embarrassment** will try to stop something they disagree with in the military field, so that they don't have to veto in the political environment.[237]

Or maybe in the decision it's a bit mistake **but you know ministers, we cannot criticize political decisions . . .** if we see problems then we need to report what kind of problems we have and we will recommendations on how to overcome those let's say problems. **But we cannot criticize the decision as such.**[238]

Chapter 8: Conclusion: Toward Total Recall in Crisis Management

No Supplementary Materials

Endnotes

[1] De Jonge Oudraat, C., S. Stojanović-Gajić, C. Washington and B. Stedman. 2014. 'Gender Mainstreaming: Indicators for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and its Related Resolutions'. 1325 Scorecard, p. 9: https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/1325-Scorecard2.pdf

[2] Former ACT official, interview 125, Norfolk, July 24, 2015.

[3] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[4] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 84, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[5] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[6] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[7] IS official, interview 1, Brussels, February 6, 2015.

[8] IS official, interview 63, Brussels, March 11, 2015.

[9] IS official, interview 72, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[10] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[11] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[12] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[13] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[14] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, April 2, 2015.

[15] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[16] IMS official, interview 98, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[17] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, April 9, 2015.

[18] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[19] IMS official, interview 114, Brussels, April 9, 2015.

[20] Military official in ACT, interview 85, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[21] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, April 9, 2015.

[22] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[23] ACT official, interview 118, Lisbon, April 20, 2015.

[24] Military representative, interview 57, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[25] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 81, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[26] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 79, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[27] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[28] ACO official, interview 47, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[29] ACO official, interview 41, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[30] IS official, interview 13, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

[31] Military representative, interview 73, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[32] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[33] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[34] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[35] Permanent representative, interview 26, Brussels, February 13, 2015.

[36] Permanent representative, interview 29, Brussels, February 13, 2015.

[37] ACO official, interview 39, 2015, Lille, March 4, 2015.

[38] ACO official, interview 39, 2015, Lille, March 4, 2015.

[39] ACO official, interview 45, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[40] ACT official, interview 111, Lisbon, April 7, 2015.

[41] JALLC official in ACT, interview 115, Lisbon, April 2, 2015.

[42] IS official, interview 30, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[43] NAC official, interview 48, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[44] Military representative, interview 53, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[45] Military representative, interview 78, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[46] IS official, interview 71, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[47] Senior military official at NATO, interview 64, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[48] IS official, interview 72, Brussels, Mach 13, 2015.

[49] Military representative, interview 50, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[50] Military official in ACT, interview 85, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[51] IS official, interview 9, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[52] ACO official, interview 41, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[53] Military representative, interview 54, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[54] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[55] IMS official, interview 86, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[56] IS official, interview 9, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[57] Permanent representative, interview 36, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[58] SHAPE official in ACO, interview 44, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[59] SHAPE official in ACO, interview 44, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[60] ACO official, interview 47, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[61] Military representative, interview 55, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[62] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[63] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[64] Deputy permanent representative, interview 20, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[65] Permanent representative, interview 23, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[66] Military representative, interview 73, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[67] ACT official, interview 117, Rome, April 17, 2015.

[68] IS official, interview 75, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[69] IS official, interview 2, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[70] Military representative, interview 31, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[71] Permanent representative, interview 4, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[72] Permanent representative, interview 22, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[73] Military representative, interview 31, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[74] SHAPE official in ACO, interview 46, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[75] NAC official, interview 10, Brussels, February 10, 2015.

[76] ACO official, interview 40, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[77] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, April 2, 2015.

[78] Permanent representative, interview 36, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[79] ACO official, interview 38, 2015, Lille, March 4, 2015.

[80] Military official in ACT, interview 85, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[81] JALLC official in ACT, interview 115, Lisbon, April 2, 2015.

[82] Military representative, interview 51, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[83] IS official, interview 63, Brussels, March 11, 2015.

[84] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, March 27, 2015.

[85] Military representative, interview 51, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[86] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, April 9, 2015.

[87] IS official, interview 2, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[88] Permanent representative, interview 22, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[89] Permanent representative, interview 22, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[90] ACO official, interview 47, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[91] Military representative, interview 55, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[92] Military representative, interview 55, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[93] Military representative, interview 65, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[94] Military representative, interview 78, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[95] IS official, interview 71, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[96] Permanent representative, interview 36, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[97] ACT official, interview 118, Lisbon, April 20, 2015.

[98] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, April 2, 2015.

[99] IS official, interview 68, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[100] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 84, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[101] IS official, interview 2, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[102] IS official, interview 109, Brussels, April 2, 2015.

[103] Military representative, interview 104, Brussels, March 27, 2015.

[104] Former ACT official, interview 125, Norfolk, July 24, 2015.

[105] Former ACT official, interview 125, Norfolk, July 24, 2015.

[106] IMS official, interview 126, Brussels, June 16, 2015.

[107] IS official, interview 66, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[108] IS official, interview 72, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[109] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[110] Military representative, interview 53, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[111] IS official, interview 13, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

[112] Senior military official at NATO, personal communication, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[113] IS official, interview 68, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[114] Deputy permanent representative, interview 20, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[115] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[116] Permanent representative, interview 22, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[117] Permanent representative, interview 4, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[118] Permanent representative, interview 7, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[119] IS official, interview 11, Brussels, February 10, 2015.

[120] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[121] Deputy military representative, interview 59, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[122] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[123] Military representative, interview 53, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[124] IS official, interview 2, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[125] Deputy military representative, interview 59, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[126] Permanent representative, interview 29, Brussels, February 13, 2015.

[127] Deputy military representative, interview 59, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[128] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[129] Former ACT official, interview 125, Norfolk, July 24, 2015.

[130] IMS official, interview 69, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[131] Military representative, interview 70, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[132] Permanent representative, interview 23, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[133] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[134] Deputy military representative, interview 59, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[135] Jacobs 2014.

[136] Fairfield 2013, 55, summarizing Collier 2011, 825.

[137] Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010.

[138] Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, 252.

[139] Dunning, T. 2014. 'Improving Process Tracing'. In Bennett, A. and Checkel, J. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 226.

[140] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[141] Permanent representative, interview 6, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[142] IMS official, interview 86, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[143] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[144] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[145] ACT civilian official, interview 123, Norfolk, June 4, 2015.

[146] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[147] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 81, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[148] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 84, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[149] IMS official, interview 92, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[150] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[151] Chwieroth 2013; Hardt 2016a; Kleine 2013; Special Issue on Informal Governance in *Review of International Organizations* 2013 (Stone et al.).

[152] Pouliot 2016, 93–94.

[153] Laity 2014, 97.

[154] Military official in ACT, interview 85, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[155] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[156] Permanent representative, interview 16, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

[157] Permanent representative, interview 6, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[158] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[159] Civilian official at JALLC in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[160] Military official in ACT, interview 85, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[161] IS official, interview 89, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[162] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, March 27, 2015.

[163] ACO official, interview 45, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[164] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[165] Military representative, interview 51, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[166] IMS official, interview 114, Brussels, April 9, 2015.

[167] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[168] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 81, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[169] IMS official, interview 96, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[170] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[171] IMS official, interview 114, Brussels, April 9, 2015.

[172] IS official, interview 13, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

[173] ACT civilian official, interview 123, Norfolk, June 4, 2015.

[174] Military representative, interview 51, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[175] Permanent representative, interview 25, Brussels, February 13, 2015.

[176] IMS official, interview 114, Brussels, April 9, 2015.

[177] Senior analyst in NATO agency, interview 37, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[178] Military representative, interview 57, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[179] Military representative, interview 65, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[180] Permanent representative, interview 18, Brussels, February 12, 2015.

[181] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[182] IS official, interview 60, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[183] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[184] Permanent representative, interview 61, Brussels, March 11, 2015.

[185] ACO official, interview 41, Mons, March 5

[186] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[187] IMS official, interview 86, Brussels, March 23, 2015.

[188] For this category, coders were permitted to provide multiple responses for each subject.

[189] Saideman 2016, 113.

[190] Former NATO official, interview 30, Brussels, February 27, 2015.

[191] ACO official, interview 38, 2015, Lille, March 4, 2015.

[192] JALLC official in ACT, interview 83, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[193] IMS official, interview 69, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[194] IMS official, interview 69, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[195] Aldrich 2009, 27.

[196] See official reports by the US and Canadian governments, respectively, as examples: Remi Hajjar, "What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 9/11?," *Military Review*, November–December 2014, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art0 13.pdf; Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention*, Handbook no. 12-16, June 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_12-16.pdf; *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 2008, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf.

[197] E.g., IS official, interview 30, Brussels, February 27; NAC official, interview 48, Brussels, March 9; military representative, interview 78, Brussels, March 13, 2015.

[198] Military representative, interview 53, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[199] IS official, interview 9, Brussels, February 9, 2015.

[200] IMS official, interview 127, Brussels, June 18, 2015.

[201] ACT civilian official, interview 123, Norfolk, June 4, 2015.

[202] IS official, interview 105, Brussels, March 27, 2015.

[203] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[204] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[205] IMS official, interview 96, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[206] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[207] Hofmann and Frese 2011.

[208] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 80, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[209] IS official, interview 11, Brussels, February 10, 2015.

[210] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[211] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[212] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[213] IMS official, interview 92, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[214] SHAPE official in ACO, interview 44, Brussels, March 6, 2015.

[215] IS official, interview 91, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[216] IS official, interview 91, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[217] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[218] Deputy military representative, interview 59, Brussels, March 10, 2015.

[219] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 79, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[220] VNC stands for "voluntary national contribution."

[221] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.

[222] IMS official, interview 96, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[223] ACT official, interview 107, Norfolk, March 31, 2015.

[224] ACT civilian official, interview 123, Norfolk, June 4, 2015.

[225] ACO official, interview 42, Mons, March 5, 2015.

[226] ACT civilian official, interview 123, Norfolk, June 4, 2015.

[227] Senior military official at NATO, interview 64, Brussels, March 12, 2015.

[228] IS official, interview 63, Brussels, March 11, 2015.

[229] Permanent representative, interview 25, Brussels, February 13, 2015.

[230] SHAPE official in ACO, interview 44, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[231] ACO official, interview 45, Mons, March 6, 2015.

[232] Military representative, interview 50, Brussels, March 9, 2015.

[233] IMS official, interview 92, Brussels, March 24, 2015.

[234] ACT official, interview 100, Lisbon, March 26, 2015.

[235] ACO official, interview 119, Mons, May 11, 2015.

[236] Permanent representative, interview 36, Brussels, March 3, 2015.

[237] IMS official, interview 97, Brussels, March 26, 2015.

[238] Military official at JALLC in ACT, interview 82, Lisbon, March 19, 2015.